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Abstract 
In recent years, numerous renewable energy cities were established worldwide, piloting different 
pathways to transition to clean energy. With the ability to address local needs more precisely in 
their unique geographic, social and economic contexts, cities play a vital role in implementing 
overall climate mitigation goals on the local level. In China, many renewable energy cities have 
emerged as well. However, official documents suggest that Chinese government authorities 
establish such renewable energy cities strategically, which leads to the assumption that the impulse 
to become renewable is different from other countries, where bottom-up initiatives are more 
common. Hence, this thesis explores answers to the question why and how the Chinese government 
promotes the energy transition of Chinese cities and regions. To comprehend the dynamics of local 
energy transition projects, this thesis adopts two frameworks from the field of sustainability 
transitions, the multi-level perspective and strategic niche management, and applies them to seven 
European and two Chinese case studies. The European sample includes the cities Graz, Güssing, 
Freiburg, and Helsinki as well as the communities Feldheim, Jühnde and Murau. The Chinese 
sample consists of the bottom-up initiative Shaanxi Sunflower Project and the demonstration project 
Tongli New Energy Town. A comparative analysis evaluates in how far the cases correspond to the 
multi-level perspective or strategic niche management. The comparison of the case studies reveals 
that the development of renewable energy cities in China goes beyond a top-down vs. bottom-up 
logic. In the Chinese context, strategic niche management should be understood as experimentation 
under hierarchy, which serves at pretesting different approaches before rolling them out 
nationwide. In addition, the analysis shows that both the multi-level perspective and strategic niche 
management have their advantages and disadvantages for niche development. Niches following the 
logic of the multi-level perspective may result in higher stakeholder acceptance, whereas strategic 
niche management can in turn accelerate niche development. However, since natural niche 
development cannot be steered intentionally, decision-makers who intend to induce local renewable 
energy projects have no other option but to resort to strategic niche management. To increase 
stakeholder acceptance and thus to improve the project outcome, decision-makers are advised to 
accommodate sufficient room for stakeholder participation in the project design.
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1. Introduction 
In light of the ever-present impacts of climate change, the Paris Agreement and the most recent 
special report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are urging for 
increased efforts to limit climate warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.1 As climate change is a global 
challenge, all countries must join forces to mitigate climate warming above the afore-mentioned 
temperature increase.2 As a result of the Paris Agreement, signatory countries have been asked 
to formulate Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in which they determine country-
specific efforts for climate change mitigation.3 However, there are not solely mitigation goals 
on the international and national level. Local initiatives on city or community levels have 
emerged too, showing significant potential to contribute to climate change mitigation.4 With 
the ability to act more promptly than international governmental and non-governmental 
political institutions, and to develop solutions tailored to local conditions, local approaches have 
shown to be better suited for multiple fields of actions within climate change mitigation.5 
Energy transition constitutes one of these fields. The energy sector was the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) in 2016 and under the seventh Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
Affordable and Clean Energy, the United Nations (UN) attributed major climate change 
contributions to the energy sector, indicating that it accounted for roughly 60 percent of total 
global GHG emissions.6 Nonetheless, all vital economic and political activities rely on access 
to energy, be it agricultural activities or employment.7 This is another reason why the energy 
sector is a critical focus area of sustainable development, and why it is indispensable to 
transition towards renewable energy (RE). 
Since local conditions vary greatly across cities and communities, resulting from differences in 
topography, geography and demography, localities know best how to tailor the energy transition 
to local needs. Hence, local communities play a crucial role in the national and eventually global 
energy transition, making the energy transition a bottom-up agenda.8 Numerous eco-cities, 
renewable (energy) cities and related projects on city and community levels have emerged, 
piloting local paths towards an increasingly renewable energy mix. Among them, certain cities 
even aim to become 100 percent renewable, and are thus termed 100 percent renewable energy 
cities.9 
                                                          
1 United Nations 2015, p. 3; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018. 
2 Feulner 2015, p. 5; United Nations 2015, p. 2. 
3 United Nations 2015, p. 3. 
4 Defrancia 2018. 
5 Droege 2006, p. 9. 
6 International Energy Agency 2018a; United Nations. It should be noted, however, that the UN do not indicate a 
year for this number. 
7 United Nations. 
8 See Lou 2013, p. 33. 
9 Lou 2013, p. 31. 
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As the largest emitter of energy-related GHG in 2016, China faces particular pressure to 
transition towards renewable energy. 10  Although many Chinese cities have joined the 
increasing number of renewable energy cities (RECs), the fact that the strategic establishment 
of RECs is explicitly enshrined in official documents leads to the assumption that the impulse 
to become renewable is different from bottom-up RE initiatives in other countries.11 A purely 
top-down approach to diffuse the energy transition in Chinese cities and communities seems 
equally unlikely, since decentralised, i.e. distributed energy generation provides significantly 
higher efficiency gains.12 City and community-specific characteristics mentioned above and the 
nature of distributed energy generation thus require the energy transition to translate into local 
transition projects, and this thesis aims to explore the dynamics of this process. 
Based on the theory of sustainability transitions, which attempts to comprehend drivers behind 
system transitions, RECs and related local initiatives can be understood as niche experiments, 
i.e. tools to test policy options before rolling them out nationwide. The aim of this thesis is to 
comprehend why and how the Chinese government promotes the transition of Chinese cities 
and regions towards 100 percent RE in the context of niche experimentation. For this purpose, 
two Chinese RECs will be investigated and projected onto a benchmark derived from 
international projects to specify to what extent the Chinese case is similar to or different from 
international practices of REC implementation. Results of this analysis may be relevant for 
other countries and thus for the global energy transition as well. 
For a better understanding of the energy transition, chapter 2 will begin by outlining the theory 
of sustainability transitions with a special focus on the concepts of the multi-level perspective 
(MLP) and strategic niche management (SNM). After explaining the major components and 
dynamics of these two concepts, the chapter will provide an introduction of the energy transition, 
define renewable energy (RE) and demonstrate the relevance of the energy transition for 
sustainable development with a status quo on the environmental impacts of energy production 
and consumption. This will lay the groundwork for investigating current challenges in the 
Chinese energy sector which give reason to promote an energy transition in China. Against this 
backdrop, chapter 2.2.3 will highlight the role of so-called renewable energy cities (RECs), i.e. 
renewable energy initiatives on the levels of regions, cities and communities both within the 
broader energy transition and within the framework of the MLP. With regard to the Chinese 
context, this chapter will put emphasis on the relevance of pilot experimentation for the 
evolution of Chinese RECs. 
Chapter 3 will proceed by applying the MLP framework onto both the global and the Chinese 
socio-technical energy system. The first part will first holistically assess landscape drivers and 
regime elements in the international energy system, while referring to the six regime elements 
                                                          
10 International Energy Agency 2018b. 
11 Lou 2013, p. 31; Lou 2015, p. 404. 
12 Droege 2006, p. 90. 
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of the MLP framework. The niche level analysis will draw from a multi-case report of seven 
European RECs which were selected according to the availability of detailed records and final 
results. To answer the question of how these niches evolved, the analysis will first follow four 
criteria which were developed to provide for sufficient comparability of the cases and 
subsequently be compared with Geels’ (2004) four phases model of niche development. In the 
second part, the Chinese energy system will be analysed using the same method, underpinned 
by two comprehensive case studies. The first case study of Shaanxi Sunflower Project was 
selected to represent a grassroots initiative, whereas the second case of Tongli New Energy 
Town describes a pilot project selected by government authorities. 
The analysis of the European and Chinese cases will be summarised in the Results section 
regarding the original question of why and how nations promote the development of RECs. The 
comparison of the findings also allows for identification of similarities and differences between 
European and Chinese RECs with regard to the designs and the development of niches, insights 
of which can consequently flow into the theoretical background. Hence, this thesis will not only 
conclude by answering the research questions, but derive implications for both future research 
on the relevant theoretical groundwork and practitioners. 
2. The sustainability and energy transition 
To grasp of the nature of the sustainability and energy transition, it is helpful to understand 
transitions in general. A basic characteristic of all transitions is that they constitute a ‘passage 
from one state, stage, subject, or place to another’, or ‘a movement, development, or evolution 
from one form, stage, or style to another’.13 Theories on transitions and system innovations 
have become particularly relevant for the discourse on sustainability, as they offer potential for 
transitions aimed at sustainable development, with critical implications for actors from politics, 
civil society and businesses.14 
Transitions are possible on different levels and in different scales. An example of a transition 
at the macro-level, on which societies transform as a whole, is the transition from rural to 
industrial societies. Transitions at the micro-level manifest in shifting ‘societal functions’, 
which Geels et al. (2004) illustrate with two examples: 1) replacing horse-and-carriage with 
motorized transport and 2) changing from telegraph to telephone.15 These examples suggest 
that transitions of societal functions are often initiated by technological replacements. Hence, 
at the core of their research, Geels et al. (2004) investigate transitions driven by changes in so-
called socio-technical systems, i.e. by reciprocal effects between technological innovation and 
social elements. 
                                                          
13 Merriam-Webster 2019, transition entry. 
14 Geels et al. 2004, p. 1. 
15 Geels et al. 2004, pp. 2–3. 
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While it is undeniable that technological innovation plays a major role for sustainable 
development in many fields, efforts to mitigate climate change must not focus on the technical 
side alone. Instead, research has been asking to develop measures for a holistic sustainable 
development which integrate all areas of human interaction, including economics, politics, 
consumption and social behaviour.16 Taking energy as an example, this would mean that efforts 
should not solely focus on improving energy efficiency but should also attempt to phase out the 
use of unsustainable energy sources, and to change electricity consumption patterns in both 
industrial businesses and private households. 
Yet, some practices are easier to adjust than others. Old technologies, for instance, can be 
replaced by sustainable innovations, and economic practices can be regulated or equipped with 
different incentive structures to prevent pollution or degrading working conditions. However, 
aspects related to cultural traditions, norms, values and mindsets of individuals and groups are 
obviously more difficult to influence. In his research, Geels (2004) has combined different 
approaches and bodies of literature to comprehend transitions and introduced the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) on sustainability transitions. His integrative approach is helpful to 
understand the different levels and factors influencing system transitions, while taking 
economic, political, technological and social elements into account with equal emphasis. The 
following section will first explain the concept of the MLP, before applying it to the 
comparative analysis of the energy transitions in Europe and China in chapter 3. 
2.1. Sustainability transitions and the multi-level perspective 
The MLP is a concept overarched by the field of sustainability transitions, which can be defined 
as ‘long-term, multi-dimensional, and fundamental transformation processes through which 
established socio-technical systems shift to more sustainable modes of production and 
consumption’17, while the MLP aims to comprehend drivers of such transitions. Different 
literature strands and approaches have derived from the sustainability transitions approach 
(STA), partly offering more concise frameworks to analyse specific aspects of transitions, partly 
attempting to develop appropriate tools that enable active management of transitions.18 Figure 
1 shows core concepts relevant to this thesis.19 The upper branch names the key analytical 
framework, the socio-technical system, and its derivative concept, the MLP. The main idea 
behind socio-technical systems is that technical innovations are embedded in social contexts, 
resulting in reciprocal effects on technological and social developments. The concept of 
                                                          
16 Köhler et al. 2017, pp. 1–2. Köhler et al. agree that sustainable change goes beyond merely introducing novel 
technologies. Change needs to extend onto dominant economic, social and political institutions as to achieve 
responsible and sustainable changes in behaviour across different stakeholders, and to promote a more thoughtful 
use of resources. 
17 Markard et al. 2012, p. 956. 
18 Fischer 2010, p. 291. 
19 The arrangement of the concepts does not correspond with a chronological order, but is rather an attempt of 
logical classification. 
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transition management on the lower branch investigates possibilities to actively manage and 
direct transitions.20 Its implications are highly relevant for decision-makers when formulating 
sustainable strategies. 
 
Figure 1 Relevant research strands within the field of STA. (Adapted from Markard et al. (2012), p. 957) 
To comprehend sustainability transitions, the concept of socio-technical systems identifies 
socio-technical regimes, landscapes and niches as levels on which drivers for transitions 
accumulate. Figure 2 illustrates the interplay of the three levels and their dynamics. At the 
niche level, learning processes and improvements in the price-performance ratio of an 
innovation create momentum. The novelty integrates into existing structures by linking up to 
other elements. 21  Hereby, the novelty becomes increasingly entrenched in the niche, and 
elements around it consolidate towards one dominant design. At the same time, emerging 
changes on the landscape level exert pressure on the regime. These dynamics from the niche 
and landscape levels lead to a destabilisation on the regime level, from which windows of 
opportunity for the technological novelties emerge.22 While the regime adjusts to the new 
circumstances, i.e. while it transitions, it may in turn exert influences onto the landscape. 
However, as discussed before, it is unlikely that these influences are steerable. 
                                                          
20 However, there is doubt whether it is possible to intentionally steer transition processes. Rather, dynamics 
within transitions are aligning to each other and thereby self-coordinating. Geels and Schot 2007, p. 402. 
21 Geels 2004, pp. 41–42. 
22 Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400. 
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Figure 2 The multi-level perspective on transitions. (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 401) 
Geels (2004) describes the relations between the regime, landscape and niche as a ‘nested 
hierarchy’, indicating that niches are embedded in regimes, which are in turn embedded in 
landscapes (see Figure 3). In regimes, linkages between elements emerge, resulting in 
increased stability, but also in greater difficulties for new technologies to permeate and 
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disseminate. Arrows between niche novelties and regimes signify that these novelties are 
especially designed to solve problems in existing regimes.23 
 
Figure 3  Nested hierarchy of landscapes, regimes and niches. (Geels 2004, p. 36) 
2.1.1. The socio-technical landscape 
The socio-technical landscape surrounds actors in niches and regimes, thereby working as their 
external environment for technological trajectories. 24  The landscape changes slowly and 
purposeful influences on it are rather improbable.25 Geels (2004) illustrates the concept with 
the following examples: 
The socio-technical landscape contains a set of heterogeneous, slow-
changing factors such as cultural and normative values, broad political 
coalitions, long-term economic developments, accumulating environmental 
problems growth, emigration. But it also contains shocks and surprises, such 
as wars, rapidly rising oil prices.26 
All these examples are external factors which evolve over time. Whereas it is unlikely that the 
regime has purposeful influence onto the landscape, landscape dynamics can in turn exert 
pressure onto the regime, leading to windows of opportunity, in which changes on the niche 
level may permeate and change the regime. Dynamics on the niche level and how they dovetail 
with the landscape and regime levels will be explained below. 
                                                          
23 Geels 2004, p. 36. 
24 Fischer 2010, p. 292; Geels 2004, p. 34. 
25 Geels 2004, p. 35. 
26 Geels 2004, p. 34. 
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2.1.2. The socio-technical regime 
The concept of the socio-technical regime refers to the coordination of activities in a network 
in which technological innovations are embedded and which is composed of different actors, 
institutions and their rules. Resulting from an emphasis on technologies in previous research, 
literature had consequently focused on a small group of technical experts in the past. In more 
recent research, however, the group of stakeholders with potential influence on technical 
developments also includes actors and institutions from markets and industries, politics and 
society as well as science and technology, which are represented in Figure 2. These stakeholder 
groups act according to different, yet compatible rules, which guide and coordinate their 
activities. The coordinating function of socio-technical regimes ensures stability within the 
socio-technical system, which is commonly visualised as trajectories developing in similar 
directions, representing parallel behaviours and activities in the regime. Consequently, 
diverging trajectories due to uncoordinated activities of the involved social groups cause 
instability for the socio-technical regime.27 This instability is particularly vital for technological 
novelties to permeate a regime from the niche level. Since established practices in the regime 
are already entrenched in its institutions, organisations, economics and culture, it is difficult for 
technological innovation to break these practices up and disseminate in the regime. Yet, 
uncoordinated or even conflicting developments within regimes may open windows of 
opportunities, through which the innovation may gain foothold in the regime and potentially 
cause broader changes. Such radical innovation is rather found on the next level, the socio-
technical niche, whereas innovations on the regime level are limited to incremental 
improvements.28 
2.1.3. The role of the niche 
The MLP logic of niche development 
The MLP has incorporated the already existing concept of niches, thus extending the view on 
transitions by a micro-level or bottom-up perspective.29 The idea behind niches is to provide 
protected space for innovations which would most likely be marginalised if they were 
commercialised under market conditions. Transferring this concept to the context of STA would 
mean that protection is granted for experiments which challenge the socio-technical regime 
with potentially sustainable outcomes.30 Throughout this thesis, the niche innovation will not 
merely refer to the introduction of RE to cities, but rather the establishment of such cities and 
regions which are striving to rely on RE in all key areas (see chapter 2.2.3).  
                                                          
27 Geels 2004, pp. 33–34. 
28 Geels 2004, pp. 35; 37–39. 
29 Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400; Markard et al. 2012, p. 957; Markard et al. 2012, p. 958. 
30 Fischer 2010, p. 294. 
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According to Geels (2004), the development of technological innovations on the niche level is 
characterised by four phases (see Figure 4). In the first phase, a new technology emerges, often 
serving to solve specific problems in existing regimes. As long as it develops within the niche, 
it remains mostly invisible on the other levels. In the meantime, the new technology is 
constantly being improved through experimentation and adapting to user needs. In the second 
phase, niche communities, i.e. expert groups evolve, conducting further research to 
incrementally improve the new technology. The innovation gains momentum and develops a 
distinctive trajectory, whereas regime influences on the novelty’s design and functions 
diminish.31 Such niche communities are comprised of ‘dedicated actors’, often consisting of 
‘outsiders or fringe actors.’32 These local actors and their networks are a crucial driver behind 
the development of niche innovations. In the third phase, the innovation improves in terms of 
economic factors influencing its further diffusion, such as cost effectiveness, but also 
compatibility with other technologies. As soon as the novelty competes on the mainstream 
market, it challenges the existing regime. Competitors may begin to imitate the new technology 
or compete in developing innovations. Hereby, other actors in the regime get involved, 
influencing their behaviour and potentially reshaping the established regime. Finally, in the 
fourth phase, the new technology replaces the old one. Incremental improvements further 
enhance the technology’s cost effectiveness, thus supporting its adoption rate. Also, the 
innovation may extend onto different market segments.33 While innovation in regimes is of 
incremental nature, niches may incubate more radical innovation due to the afore-mentioned 
protection from market selection. These radical niche-level innovations can permeate the socio-
technical system, when processes at the regime and landscape levels create a window of 
opportunity.34 
                                                          
31 Geels 2004, pp. 40–41. 
32 Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400. 
33 Geels 2004, pp. 41–42. 
34 Geels 2004, p. 35; 37. 
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Figure 4 The four phases of niche development. (Own illustration based on Geels (2004), pp. 39-42) 
Niche formation through strategic niche management 
As opposed to the MLP, which describes a spontaneous emergence and dynamic development 
of niches, the second research strand within the STA, transition management (see Figure 1), 
has been investigating possibilities to establish niches strategically and to instigate changes on 
the regime level by active management. A concept derived from transition management is 
strategic niche management (SNM), which is defined as ‘the creation, development and 
controlled phase-out of protected spaces for the development and use of promising technologies 
by means of experimentation, with the aim of 1) learning more about the desirability of the 
technology, and 2) enhancing the development and rate of application of the new technology.’35 
Hence, based on the logic of niches offering protected spaces for technological innovations, 
strategic niche management aims at enabling and managing these protected spaces.36 
To strategically manage sustainable changes, Kemp et al. (1998) proposed three strategies for 
policy-makers. The first strategy suggests changing incentive structures behind market forces. 
Policy-makers can bring about radical behavioural changes with environmentally benign 
outcomes by ‘tax[ing] negative externalities and reward[ing] positive externalities’. As Kemp 
et al. (1998) implicitly criticise, however, policy-makers often focus too much on finding new 
technologies to solve certain problems, instead of adjusting existing configurations in the 
regime. This approach requires drastic measures, whereas the effects of such financial 
incentives are not necessarily sufficient to instigate a broader regime change.37 The second 
strategy recommends preparing the launch of a new socio-technical regime as if it were a market 
entry. Yet, this approach is restricted by the fact that socio-technical regimes are too complex 
                                                          
35 Schot et al. 1999. 
36 Kemp et al. 1998, p. 186. 
37 Kemp et al. 1998, pp. 184–185. 
Phase 1
• A new technology emerges to solve a local problem.
Phase 2
• A niche community forms and incrementally improves the innovation.
Phase 3
• The innovation increases its competitiveness through improved cost 
effectiveness and compatibility with other technologies.
Phase 4
• The innovation replaces the dominant technology.
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and interrelated with other aspects of social organisation to be planned. Just as it is difficult for 
firms to plan the successful commercialisation of an innovation, the success of a strategically 
induced transition remains unpredictable.38 The third strategy relies on ‘on-going dynamics of 
socio-technical change’, exerting controlled pressure to steer these dynamics into the desired 
direction. In this approach, policy-makers can get involved actively in the process of socio-
technical change, which includes ‘creating room for experimentation and variation’, as well as 
avoiding the dominance of certain actors.39 The notions of these different strategies will be 
useful for the analysis of RECs. 
Nevertheless, there is controversy around the question if niche dynamics and broader transitions 
can be directed in a specific direction at all. Geels et al. (2004) argue: ‘Public authorities are 
just one societal group among several others. Like other groups, they have limited power, a 
limited cognitive perspective and limited resources to influence system dynamics.’ 40 
Accordingly, the authors negate the possibility of politics to strategically induce and steer 
transitions. Against this criticism, the SNM approach stresses the involvement of a broader 
group of stakeholders throughout the process of niche development, particularly emphasising 
the role of the users of an innovation. Users contribute significantly to learning processes, 
results of which can then subsequently enter institutionalisation.41  
Institutionalisation is another key component of SNM. Rather than focusing on experimenting 
with a technological novelty alone, SNM strives to integrate the innovation in existing 
institutions as to enable learning processes which further enhance the new technology.42 This 
is particularly critical in light of the fact that the need to transition towards cleaner energy is on 
the agenda of multiple countries and multi-lateral coalitions. For instance, the German Federal 
Government has coined the term Energiewende and aims to turn it into a driving force for the 
country’s economic and infrastructural activities. Subsequently, the German Ministry of 
Economy and Energy (BMWi) has developed an ‘energy concept’, which breaks down 
necessary targets across the political, strategic and coordination levels.43 Similarly, the aim to 
transition towards clean energy under the SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy connects all 
signatory countries.44 
Nevertheless, SNM is not just a political task. Instead, niche managers can come from various 
backgrounds, such as politics, industry, and civil society. Depending on core competencies, 
actors such as NGOs or industries may be more qualified for certain processes. For instance, 
whereas governments are better at regulating the niche, NGOs may be more appropriate for the 
                                                          
38 Kemp et al. 1998, p. 185. 
39 Kemp et al. 1998, pp. 184–185. 
40 Geels et al. 2004, p. 8. 
41 Kemp et al. 1998, p. 186. 
42 Kemp et al. 1998, p. 186. 
43 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019a; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019b. 
44 United Nations. 
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actual execution of niche projects. However, an important notion is that SNM is a collective 
task, rather than in the hands of a single individual or organisation. Although it is possible that 
some actors are more dominant than others, SNM requires inclusive negotiations with all parties 
involved.45 For the afore-mentioned reason that governments may engage in SNM to achieve 
their energy agendas, this has important implications for the design of the niches. A set of 
different niche designs will be introduced in chapters 3.1.3 and 3.2.3. Before, chapters 3.1 and 
3.2 will apply the MLP approach to the case of energy transitions in Europa and China, by 
identifying drivers and influences on the different levels. However, to better understand why it 
is indispensable to transition towards cleaner energy, chapter 2.2 will first provide a status quo 
of the energy sector in a global and a Chinese context. 
2.2. The energy transition 
To understand the role of energy in the context of sustainable development, it is critical to 
distinguish fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. To this end, the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory provides a useful classification of different energy sources (see Figure 5).46 
Based on this classification, renewable energy sources in this thesis include solar, wind, 
geothermal, hydro and both biomass and biogas energy. 
 
Figure 5 Classification of energy sources. (Own illustration based on National Energy Laboratory (2015), p. 2) 
Energy is one of the fields of actions with the largest potential to induce changes for more 
sustainable social and economic structures.47 Accounting for roughly 42 percent of total global 
GHG emissions in 2016 (see Figure 6), the energy sector is a major contributor to climate 
change.48 Whereas CO2 emissions slightly declined between 2014 and 2016, presumable due 
to improved energy efficiency and a broader use of low-carbon technology across countries 
which were able to curb coal demand, global economic growth eventually surpassed energy 
productivity between 2017 and 2018. Therefore, CO2 emissions increased in 2017, although 
RE and nuclear energy contributed to the decoupling of emissions growth from energy 
                                                          
45 Kemp et al. 1998, pp. 188–189. 
46 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 2015, p. 2 According to this classification, conditionally renewable 
energy sources indicate that the suitability of these energy sources for renewable energy projects depend 
largely on local conditions. Energy sources that yet need to be clarified comprise ‘[t]echnologies remaining 
under consideration’, i.e. which are not renewable in the stricter sense. 
47 Köhler et al. 2017, p. 2. 
48 Moomaw et al. 2012, p. 164. 
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demand. 49  Especially in 2018, global energy consumption grew at a pace of 2.3 percent 
compared to 2017, a growth rate twice the average since 2010. Reasons for this unprecedented 
speed have been strong global economic growth, along with changing weather conditions in 
certain regions which have increased the demand for heating and cooling. Resulting from the 
growing energy consumption, CO2 emissions amounted to 33.1 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2018, thus 
reaching a new high with a growth rate of 1.7 percent compared to the previous year. 50 
According to IEA’s estimations, global energy demand is yet to increase due to rising incomes 
and population growth, leading to a demand growth of more than 25 percent by 2040.51 
 
 
Figure 6 Distribution of energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors in 2016. (Adapted from Statista (2018)) 
The increase in global CO2 emissions related to the growing energy demand has verifiable 
effects on global climate warming. The IEA found that CO2 emissions from coal combustion 
accounted for more than 0.3°C of the 1°C global average temperature increase compared to pre-
industrial levels. Thus, coal has become the major source of global temperature increase.52 
Coal-fired power generation continues to be the single largest emitter of CO2, accounting for 
30 percent of all energy-related CO2 emissions and 56.6 percent of all anthropogenic GHG 
emissions.53 
The energy transition, defined as ‘a radical reconfiguration of the way we generate and use 
energy in cities and beyond’ 54 has shown significant effects to contribute against climate 
                                                          
49 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 7. 
50 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 4. BP estimations are even higher, with total global CO2 emissions 
amounting to 33.9 Gt in 2018. See BP 2019, p. 57. 
51 International Energy Agency 2018c. 
52 International Energy Agency 2019, pp. 7–8 ‘Pre-industrial’ levels are commonly used as a reference for global 
mean surface temperature (GMST) during the period of 1890-1900. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2018, p. 24. 
53 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 4; Moomaw et al. 2012, p. 164. 
54 Rohracher and Späth 2014, p. 1416. 
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warming internationally. By increasing the use of RE technology, the energy transition was able 
to avoid 215 million tonnes (Mt) of emissions in the power sector in 2018. These emission 
savings can largely be attributed to energy transition measures in China and Europe. Together, 
their emission savings accounted for two-thirds of total global emissions saved through RE. 
The transition towards renewable energy sources in 2018 was already able to cut emissions 
growth by 50 percent.55 Although global renewable energy generation increased from 490.2 
Mtoe in 2017 to 561.3 Mtoe in 2018 and thus accounted for a growth rate of 14.5 percent, the 
global expansion of RE still falls behind global electricity demand.56  
Therefore, it remains imperative to support and accelerate the expansion of RE technologies as 
to further reduce GHG emissions and limit climate warming. The positive results of the energy 
transition on climate change mitigation suggest that the energy transition is an effective 
approach to both limit GHG emissions and global temperature increases. Following this logic, 
countries should engage more actively to advance energy transitions on a national level, 
eventually joining forces for an international energy transition. 
For a better understanding of what forces are in play in the energy transition, section 2.2.1 will 
provide a general overview of the socio-technical energy system illustrated with the MLP 
framework, before transferring the framework to the global and the Chinese energy systems 
throughout chapter 3. 
2.2.1. The socio-technical energy system 
With this potential to contribute to climate change mitigation, the energy transition can be seen 
as one development among several within the overall field of sustainability transitions. 57 
Analogous to the goal behind sustainability transitions to shift towards more sustainable modes 
of production and consumption, the energy transition aims to make the generation and 
consumption of energy more sustainable. Furthermore, being driven by the development and 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies, the energy transition becomes a field of action for 
changes at the level of the socio-technical regime. Seen from the MLP, the concept of energy 
systems does not differ significantly from the general understanding of socio-technical systems, 
as the following definition shows. 
                                                          
55 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 8. Nuclear energy generation has also played a significant role in these 
CO2 emission savings. 
56 BP 2019, p. 52; International Energy Agency 2019, p. 4. 
57 Other sustainability transitions occure, for instance, in agriculture and food, water, buildings, and waste 
management. Köhler et al. 2019, p. 2. 
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Energy systems are socio-technical configurations where technologies, 
institutional arrangements (for example, regulation, norms), social practices 
and actor constellations (such as user–producer relations and interactions, 
intermediary organisations, public authorities, etc.) mutually depend on and 
co-evolve with each other.58 
Accordingly, the previous figure (Figure 2) illustrating the MLP perspective on transitions can 
be transferred onto the energy transition as well. Building on Geels (2004) and Köhler (2017), 
Figure 7 visualises elements in the current and future socio-technical energy regime, including 
the pressure that social and ecological trends such as changing demographics, increasing 
urbanisation, aggravating resource depletion and climate change exert on the existing energy 
regime. The ability of niche actors to react more promptly to these trends than the regime itself 
causes tensions for the regime, eventually forcing it to open and adapt to the pressure coming 
from below and above, i.e. from the niche and the landscape.59 For instance, following an 
increased demand for localised energy generation, new trajectories may lead away from 
centralised energy supply by incumbent energy facilities and businesses, moving towards local 
civil energy cooperatives. Expanding technological capacities for e.g. rooftop photovoltaic (PV) 
panels support this trend. These new developments exemplify how various activities, 
represented by miniature arrows pointing in different directions, consolidate and align to one 
direction. 
 
Figure 7 The socio-technical energy system. (Adapted from Geels (2004), p. 401 and Köhler (2017), p. 5) 
In Germany, which is referred to as a model country for the energy transition hence observed 
by countries worldwide, the energy transition is defined as a ‘replacement of fossil and nuclear 
                                                          
58 Rohracher and Späth 2014, p. 1417. 
59 Köhler et al. 2017, p. 4. 
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energy sources with an ecological, sustainable energy supply’60. Whereas the goal to transition 
towards renewable energy is commonly shared, there can be stark country-specific differences 
in the definitions of renewable energy. The British Office of the Deputy Prime Minister defined 
renewable energy as ‘those energy flows that occur naturally and repeatedly in the environment 
– from the wind, the fall of water, the movement of the oceans, from the sun and also from 
biomass […] but not energy from mass incineration of domestic waste’61. Hence, both the 
German and British definitions exclude nuclear energy in their understanding of renewable 
energy sources. The British example explicitly rejects waste incineration, which is not the case 
in many states in the US, nor does Germany refrain from burning waste and declaring the 
resulting waste heat as ‘recycled’.62 In China, however, nuclear energy is seen as a green energy 
source. That explains why China has been expanding its capacities for nuclear energy, which 
also reflects on the Chinese energy mix.63 Nonetheless, China has been engaged actively in the 
national and international energy transition. The underlying reasons for this engagement will 
be highlighted in the next section. 
2.2.2. The energy transition in China 
There are multiple motivations for China to transform its national energy system and to become 
100 percent renewable, which can be divided into external and domestic. From an external 
perspective, China has been facing increasing international pressure for being the largest emitter 
worldwide. 64  Figure 8 shows that China ranks first, with energy-related CO2 emissions 
significantly higher than in the US, which ranks second. In 2017, China attributed 28 percent 
of total global energy-related CO2 emissions.65 CO2 emissions declined between 2015 and 2016, 
before increasing to 9.2 Gt in 2017 and 9.4 Gt in 2018, although the IEA (2017) estimates that 
coal consumption and CO2 emissions will continue to decline.66 
The Chinese energy demand growth has correlated with the country’s GDP growth, before it 
saw a decline since 2014.67 Nonetheless, in 2018, the Chinese energy demand grew by 3.5 
percent, amounting to 3155 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) and thus reaching a new 
high since 2012. In sum, China’s energy demand constitutes a third of global energy demand 
growth, while China, India and the US account for roughly 70 percent of global energy demand 
                                                          
60 Duden 2019, Energiewende entry; Droege 2006, p. 53; Energy Reform Institute and China National 
Renewable Energy Centre 2019, p. 3. 
61 ODPM 2004, p. 3. 
62 Donahue 2018. 
63 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 5; Fischer 2018, p. 7. 
64 Aklin and Urpelainen 2018, p. 202. 
65 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 554 Yet, with per-capita emissions of 6.5t of CO2, China remains 
below the average of advanced economies. 
66 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 476; BP 2019, p. 57. 
67 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 554. 
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growth.68 With the Chinese automobile sector at the forefront of electric vehicle sales, and more 
and more end-uses being electrified, the domestic energy demand is expected to grow further.69 
  
Figure 8 Energy-related CO2 emissions in selected regions and countries in 2017 (in million tonnes). (Adapted from 
Statista (2018) 
However, rather than by international pressure or the commitment to participate in global efforts 
for climate change mitigation, Chinese energy policy is primarily driven by the need to solve 
domestic energy challenges.70 The increasing energy demand in China has translated into a 
greater demand for coal, gas and oil, which China has been importing to prevent supply 
bottlenecks. For instance, in 2018, energy imports amounted to 70.9 percent of the country’s 
oil consumption and 45.3 percent of gas consumption.71 The resulting dependence on energy 
imports poses a potential risk to China’s national energy security. At the same time, aggravating 
environmental and health problems, which come with significant economic costs, make it 
imperative for Chinese energy policy to expand the use of RE.72 Hence, the Chinese energy 
sector is turning to RE as a reaction to increased energy demand, endangered energy security 
and negative health impacts, such as poor air quality.73 
Indeed, the share of RE in the Chinese energy mix has increased, but it is nonetheless falling 
short to satisfy the domestic energy demand, and despite the favourable trend for RE, the 
complete phase-out of coal-fired energy will take China several decades.74 Besides, China sees 
a possibility in the energy transition to gain a competitive advantage on the market for RE 
technologies. By shaping the industry standard for RE technology worldwide, China will be 
able to avoid additional costs related to acquiring foreign technologies and license fees.75 Thus, 
the competition for the innovative edge in RE technologies turns into an incentive for the 
                                                          
68 International Energy Agency 2019, p. 5. 
69 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 556; Fischer 2018, p. 7. 
70 Fischer 2018, p. 10. 
71 Energy Reform Institute and China National Renewable Energy Centre 2019, p. 4. 
72 Fischer 2018, p. 6. 
73 Aklin and Urpelainen 2018, p. 201. 
74 Fischer 2018, p. 7; Aklin and Urpelainen 2018, p. 203. 
75 Fischer 2018, p. 8. 
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Chinese government to actively expand the use of RE domestically. Vice versa, one can argue 
that the energy transition translates into a business field with significant economic potential.76 
2.2.3. The role of Renewable Energy Cities 
An increasing body of literature related to sustainability transition theory has classified RE 
projects on the levels of communities, cities and regions as niche projects within the socio-
technical energy system. Beginning with the expansion of RE at this level is particularly 
reasonable since the niche level is where the introduction of RE technologies and related 
programmes becomes ‘most visible and tangible’77, although ideally, the energy transition is a 
global concept. Furthermore, three additional characteristics of cities and regions qualify them 
to be approached with the MLP, which Späth and Rohracher (2012) summarise as follows:  
Cities and regions are often large enough to incorporate at least some of the 
systemic properties of existing regime structures (typical supply structures, 
relations of supply and demand, etc.). At the same time, they can be small 
enough to exploit the advantages of proximity for the creation of new actor 
networks, discourses and institutions for alternate sociotechnical 
configurations. Thirdly, they often have well-established governance 
structures to coordinate change processes (not only city or regional 
governments, but often also well-organized civil society organizations and 
networks involved in urban or regional governance).78 
Generally, renewable energy cities (RECs) are defined as cities that exclusively use renewable 
energy for the supply of electricity, transport, heating and cooling, while emphasising the 
development of the renewable energy sector.79 In Chinese early stage energy research, the 
broader term ‘energy city’ was rather common. It was used to describe cities which produced 
large amounts of energy. Only in recent years, research has become more differentiated, and 
perspectives on transition, low carbon development and environmental protection became 
prevalent topics in the discussion.80 
At the same time, ‘solar energy cities’, ‘renewable energy construction pilot cities’, ‘wind 
energy cities’, ‘new energy cities’, ‘new energy vehicle pilot cities’ and ‘low carbon cities’ 
appeared in many Chinese regions.81 As reflected in these diversified project designations, there 
are broad and narrow understandings of RECs. Apart from the narrow understanding of RECs 
given in the previous paragraph, there exists a broader understanding as well. According to the 
broad understanding, 100 percent RECs might not cover all areas of energy consumption, but 
they can be specialized in either of the three areas or a certain source of renewable energy, such 
as solar PV. Consequently, this specialisation is reflected on project titles such as ‘100 percent 
                                                          
76 Droege 2006, p. 24; International Energy Agency 2017a, p. 12. 
77 Droege 2006, p. 25. 
78 Späth and Rohracher 2012, p. 467. 
79 Lou 2013, p. 30. 
80 Lou 2017, p. 174. 
81 Lou 2013, p. 31. 
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renewable electricity cities’, ‘100 percent renewable energy construction cities’ or ‘100 percent 
solar energy cities’. Such specialised REC projects are easier to realise than holistic RECs and 
thus suitable for any city type, in particular for large Chinese cities.82 Consequently, the broader 
understanding of the term is much more commonly used when talking about Chinese RECs. In 
this thesis, the abbreviation RECs will refer to the narrow understanding, i.e. to projects which 
target an almost entirely renewable energy mix. Although the abbreviation ‘REC’ represents 
only renewable energy cities, it will include projects on the level of regions and villages as well. 
In China, city-level and regional projects as RECs fulfil a particular role. Although not 
emphasised in the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) of the central government, the 12th FYP published 
by the National Energy Agency (NEA) explicitly names RECs, planning to construct 100 RECs, 
as well as 1000 new energy model regions, with the aim of advancing new energy technologies 
and standardising their application in cities.83 In the context of experimentation under hierarchy, 
i.e. as purposefully installed pilot projects, the Chinese RECs serve to pre-test technological 
innovations and economic or political configurations before selected appropriate experiments 
are rolled out nationwide. Such experiments result from a hybrid bottom-up and top-down 
approach, which is distinctive for Chinese policy-making.84 According to Heilmann (2008), 
such experiments in China show themselves in three forms, which are 1) experimental 
regulation, in which trial implementation of a new policy is accompanied with provisional rules; 
2) experimental points, which launch model demonstrations and pilot projects; 3) experimental 
zones, which make room for local jurisdictions that are endowed with ‘broad discretionary 
powers’.85 In all three categories, the actual hands-on experiments happen at the local level, 
while the central government filters out appropriate and scalable experiments based on local 
experiences.86  
Based on this classification, Chinese RECs correspond to experimental points, while also 
showing striking overlaps with SNM.87 Seen from an SNM perspective, the installation of 
experimental points equals the provision of protected spaces for innovations, i.e. the intentional 
creation of niches. Consequently, one can conclude that SNM is a strategic tool for top-down 
policy-making. With regard to the analysis of such experiments, however, Heilmann (2008) 
considers the distinction between bottom-up and top-down initiation of policy experiments 
‘nearly meaningless’. He argues that neither exists in a pure form but rather, the central and 
local levels are interdependent, i.e. the central government relies on the execution and 
experiences from the local level, while local governments depend on the central government to 
                                                          
82 Lou 2013, pp. 32–33. 
83 Lou 2013, p. 31. 
84 Heilmann 2008a, p. 29 However, ‘bottom-up’ is not to be mistaken with the grassroots level, but it refers to 
lower administrative levels. 
85 Heilmann 2008b, p. 5. 
86 Heilmann 2008b, p. 11. 
87 Heilmann 2008b, p. 5. 
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make room for protected experimentation.88 Analogously, Chinese RECs should be seen in 
China as a result of a hybrid evolution from decentralised initiatives and centralised selection. 
In order to assess the evolution of different niches in the context of SNM and to comprehend 
drivers behind Chinese RECs while considering the shortcomings of such a dichotomy, this 
thesis will place niche experiments on a continuum ranging from bottom-up (MLP) to top-down 
(SNM), as to grasp niches which evolved at the intermediate level as well. This will allow 
determining if there is an ideal position for RECs on this continuum and what this implies for 
an ideal niche design. 
3. Comparative analysis: the global and the Chinese socio-technical energy systems 
Although the MLP has gained wide attention in the literature on sustainability transitions and 
provided useful heuristics to obtain a structured overview of socio-technical systems, in the 
case of RECs, little research has adopted the MLP as a framework to concretely analyse the 
energy sector. Instead, one finds various descriptive articles on selected case studies of regions 
and communities on their way to energy self-sufficiency, which focus on the niche level 
detached from the multi-level nature of the MLP.89 Practical applications of this analytical 
framework can be found in a series of working papers from authors of Fraunhofer Institute for 
Systems and Innovation Research, who combine descriptive case studies with the MLP.90 Their 
method gives guidance for transferring the MLP onto other socio-technical systems as well. 
Following this approach, this section will first apply the MLP to the global energy system to 
provide a holistic assessment of the landscape, regime and niche level, drawing on a 
compilation of international case studies. For this purpose, chapter 3.1 will first assess general 
drivers on the landscape level. For the regime level (chapter 3.1.2), this thesis will extend 
Köhler et al.’s (2017) approach by structuring the analysis of RECs along the key elements 
culture, industry, markets and user preferences, policy, science and technology in 
correspondence with Geels and Schot’s (2007) MLP on transitions. Furthermore, to make 
existing case studies more comparable, this thesis has developed the four criteria initiation, 
stakeholder participation, government influence and function of the niche. These criteria were 
developed to comprehend causal directions in niche development, particularly to grasp 
indicators of SNM. The ultimate goal of this approach is to give an overview of different forms 
and features of niche development for orientation, before assessing such niches in the Chinese 
context. 
China-specific sustainability transition literature has been suffering from similarly incomplete 
research. Despite a comprehensive body of literature on the Chinese energy sector and its 
transition to sustainable energy, research has not yet applied the MLP to the Chinese case. 
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Hence, a structured understanding of drivers in the Chinese energy transition is missing. For 
this reason, chapter 3.2 will analyse the Chinese energy system in an analogous manner. By 
looking at both the international and the Chinese energy systems, this thesis attempts to grasp 
driving forces for the Chinese energy transition against the backdrop of an international 
reference, while the MLP framework allows to capture such forces on both the macro 
(landscape and regime) and the micro-level (niches) of socio-technical energy systems. 
To assess different forms of niche formation, i.e. the evolution of RECs, the analysis of both 
the global and the Chinese energy systems will conclude with case study analyses. For the 
international niche level, this thesis will conduct a multi-case report composed of seven 
European RECs in Graz, Güssing, Feldheim, Freiburg, Helsinki, Jühnde and Murau. The 
analysis of Chinese RECs will be centred around two case studies in Shaanxi and Tongli. 
Finally, the results of the case studies will be compared and evaluated in chapter 3.3. 
3.1. The global socio-technical energy system 
The global socio-technical energy system can be understood as the international energy sector 
with a focus on the interplay of different elements across the three levels landscape, regime and 
niche. This international energy system is in turn composed of numerous heterogeneous 
subsystems, i.e. national and regional energy systems. Following this logic, the international 
energy system is where overall developments of the energy sector take place, without the ability 
to capture country-specific characteristics. Yet, the analysis of this general energy system 
allows to comprehend crucial drivers and challenges for the energy sectors, which will most 
likely have effects on the country-level as well. To this end, annual reports such as the Special 
Report of the IPCC by Moomaw et al. (2012), as well as the World Energy Outlook and the 
Global Energy and CO2 Status Report published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
which are widely renowned in climate and energy-related academia, will constitute the base of 
the following analysis. The analysis will correspond to the structure of the MLP, beginning with 
trends on the landscape level, followed by elements of the global energy regime and finally 
introducing findings from case studies on RECs. 
3.1.1. The international socio-technical energy landscape 
The international energy regime faces pressure from various trends on the global socio-
technical landscape level. Demographic change, for instance, has implications for energy 
demand, energy infrastructure and energy capacity by affecting the population size in different 
regions as well as the number of users.91 Climate change caused an increased demand for 
heating and cooling as a result of extreme temperatures in winter and summer. From a macro-
economic perspective, global economic stability manifested in a rising energy demand as 
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well.92 More recently, the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 has gained much 
attention. Although the exact impacts remain unclear, it is assumed that the US will not only 
increase domestic emissions, but also affect climate policy in other countries as well.93 Thus, 
the far-reaching impacts of the US’ withdrawal make it a landscape driver in the international 
energy system creating pressure on the energy regimes of other countries. 
Yet, the intensity of landscape pressure seems to differ across countries. While nuclear incidents 
such as Chernobyl in 1986 or Fukushima in 2011 resulted in stronger commitment from the 
German government to phase out nuclear energy, countries including China still classify 
nuclear energy as a clean and reliable energy source.94 Thus, this shock on the landscape level 
had seemingly little influence on the energy mix in the relevant countries. 
3.1.2. The international socio-technical energy regime 
A major challenge when proceeding to the next level is to assess the socio-technical regime in 
an appropriate scope. Similar to the overall socio-technical system, regimes vary in size. Along 
with the development of subsystems, regimes can thus be classified into sub-regimes based on 
their technological features or scope. For instance, one can distinguish three sub-regimes within 
the overall energy system: the electricity regime, the transport regime and the heating regime.95 
A regime analysis can either look at specific energy sources or entire energy markets. Yet, an 
analysis of regimes at the micro-level which neglects macro-level impacts tends to produce a 
distorted perception of regime shifts. As Geels and Schot (2007) find, ‘[w]hat looks like a 
regime shift at one level may be viewed merely as an incremental change in inputs for a wider 
regime at another level.’96 This implies that a country’s energy sector can either be seen as a 
socio-technical system in itself or as a subsystem within the global energy system. However, 
due to the effects of globalisation on the energy market, the two systems cannot be entirely 
differentiated. Global trends, such as digitalisation still manifest in landscape elements in the 
regional energy system as well. Developments in the energy sector may also be overarched by 
national climate policy, which can in turn be seen as a component of international mitigation 
efforts against climate change. This explains why Späth and Rohracher (2012) ask for analysing 
regimes in national or global contexts, although they admit at the same time that regimes vary 
across nations as well as regionally.97 For this reason, this thesis will begin with an analysis of 
the international socio-technical energy regime in order to capture such global developments. 
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Based on Figure 2 by Geels and Schot (2007) shown previously, the socio-technical regime 
encompasses trajectories from culture, industry, markets and user preferences, policy, science, 
and technology. These criteria will mark the structure of this regime analysis.  
Culture 
Researchers have noticed an increased awareness of climate change, which has positive effects 
on the acceptance towards the energy transition and the adoption of RE.98 However, numerous 
intangible factors, which are embedded in the culture and guide human behaviour, represent 
obstacles for the expansion of RE. Socially entrenched values and norms may manifest in a 
varying degree of acceptance of RE technologies by local stakeholders. Insufficiently paying 
attention to stakeholder concerns may in turn evoke resistant behaviour. These concerns are 
mostly related to the potential impact of RE technologies on their ‘behaviour, natural habitats 
and natural and human heritage sites, including impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, 
landscape aesthetics, and water/land use and water/land use rights as well as their availability 
for competing uses’.99 The latter constitutes a particular source of conflict. With regard to the 
installation of wind farms, there is little opposition from the farmers themselves. Wind farms 
do not interfere with normal agricultural activities but are rather considered as a source of 
additional income through ownership or leasing contracts. Instead, resistance against wind 
farms comes from other stakeholders, who advocate for different land uses or consider the 
installation of RE technologies as a threat.100 Such land conflicts are not restricted to wind 
energy but can occur with other RE technologies as well. 
Cultural norms and values play a significant role for residents as well. As cultural science 
research indicates, the individuals’ identification with their households determines their 
activities at home and thus shape households’ energy consumption. Hence, energy consumption 
and energy-saving behaviour is influenced by ‘attitudes, social norms and identity’.101 However, 
if policy designs fail to address these behavioural aspects appropriately, the individuals’ 
environmental awareness will not translate into action, resulting in ‘awareness-behaviour’ and 
‘value-action gaps’.102 This has negative effects on energy consumption. 
Industry 
A major obstacle for the expansion of RE are incumbents in the energy sector, such as large 
energy utilities which dominate the energy market as monopolies. As highlighted by the IPCC 
special report, monopolies inhibit competition in the energy market and lead to underinvestment 
in RE technologies due to deficient IP protection for innovators. This implication is relevant 
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for the Chinese energy regime as well. Particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the 
energy sector shows monopolised structures, with one or a few incumbent facilities taking over 
all major supply functions from power generation to transmission and distribution to customer 
services. Despite efforts to liberalise energy markets in several countries, current regulations 
still support centralised generation, transmission and distribution of energy, leaving little room 
for RE technologies. Hence, due to their dominant role in the energy sector, such monopolies 
often benefit from favourable energy regulations.103 
Markets and user preferences 
A major trend in the energy regime has been the decentralisation of the energy infrastructure.104 
This trend can be explained by technical characteristics of distributed energy generation which 
require the dispersed installation of RE plants, allowing energy generation at the point of use, 
both in urban and rural areas.105 The expansion of distributed energy generation is further 
facilitated by decreasing costs of distributed energy technology along with an increasing degree 
of digitalisation within the energy system.106 
Economic incentives, however, can substantially impede the expansion of RE. Whereas the 
need to replace old energy infrastructure potentially opens a window of opportunity for new and 
more energy efficient technologies, high initial investments, switching costs and higher prices 
for RE result in reluctance to invest in more sustainable electricity or heating, particularly 
among private households.107 Existing energy systems in private households are often too old 
and inefficient to contribute to national GHG reduction targets, but households have little 
incentive to invest in energetic restoration due to long life-cycles of the installed energy 
system.108 Despite increased price competitiveness, up-front costs of RE units exceeding the 
costs for conventional energy units make them unaffordable for a large part of customers. In 
fact, initial capital costs account for the major part of the overall costs of an RE system.109 
Levelized costs of energy (LCOE) from RE technologies, which take into account the costs of 
an energy generation unit over its entire lifecycle, remain higher than for conventional energy 
as well.110 This lowers the attractiveness of RE technologies over conventional energy. In 
addition, from the perspective of individual users, various insecurities affect their willingness 
to invest in RE installations such as rooftop solar PV panels. These insecurities includes 
concerns about ‘their own economic situation, development of energy prices, access to loans, 
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limited knowledge of consumption, savings potential or concrete funding opportunities, as well 
as subjective preferences or prejudices towards certain technologies’.111 
Policy 
Equally vital for the energy transition are policies related to climate change mitigation, such as 
official measures and targets. 112  These include national policies as well as international 
commitments. Since the Paris Agreement, for instance, 180 countries have formulated NDCs 
which, under the overarching goal to reduce GHG emissions, also include ambitions to expand 
the use of RE. 113  Policies facilitating the expansion of distributed energy are particularly 
promising, since this form of energy generation is immune to global politics of fuels and 
resources. Whereas supplying countries rich in fossil fuels may shut down e.g. the supply of 
gas as a result of political conflicts, distributed energy systems (DES), allowing for generation 
and consumption of RE on-site, reduce the reliance on international fuel suppliers. They are 
thus invulnerable to this kind of political and energy-related destabilisation.114 
Nevertheless, unfavourable policy elements can pose a significant obstacle for the expansion 
of RE. For instance, so-called “hard institutions”115 include inappropriate or lacking standards 
and regulations which disincentivise behaviour and actions in line with the energy transition. 
Apart from the lack of appropriate policy programmes, over-regulation is also an example of a 
discouraging policy. As a result, such regulations and standards impede the development of 
regime deviations. For instance, overly demanding regulations can impede the profitability of 
businesses which struggle to conform. Apart from hard institutions, their counterpart “soft 
institutions”116, which include relationships between key stakeholders, can be a source of 
conflict as well. For examples, disputes between project teams, residents and banks may lower 
acceptance towards the energy transition, potentially hampering the development of the niche. 
Furthermore, public institutions tend to believe that shifting away from fossil fuels is 
accompanied by immense economic and transactional costs. In fact, however, high fossil fuel 
prices cause higher welfare losses than effective climate policies.117 Due to their dominant role 
in the energy sector, regulations for energy businesses are often centred around energy 
monopolies. Finally, as mentioned in criterion Industry, existing regulations continue to support 
centralised generation, transmission and distribution of energy in many countries. 118  This 
circumstance reinforces the dominance of energy monopolies. 
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Science 
Science on RE technologies is hampered by lack of data, such as the output of natural resources 
in combination with topographic conditions. For instance, the energy output of wind turbines 
varies depending on local topography. Obtaining this type of data, however, is connected to 
significant measurement and modelling efforts, which may overwhelm smaller communities.119 
In addition, skills shortage, i.e. the lack of trained human resources inhibits research and 
development in the field of RE technologies in two ways. On the one hand, versatile expertise 
in areas such as mechanics, chemistry, and engineering but also in business management and 
social sciences is vital for the development of RE technologies. On the other hand, dispersed 
RE systems require skilled technical support on-site, particularly in remote or underdeveloped 
areas. The deployment of RE must hence be accompanied by training for experts and local 
stakeholders.120 Yet, technological innovation related to RE suffers from deficient IP protection, 
impeding RE research as well. Although improved IP protection through patents can incentivise 
innovators and help attract more private R&D investment, related access costs for these 
technologies may discriminate against developing countries which are in need of such RE 
technologies.121 
Technology 
RE technologies have specialised along the different energy sources, which can be seen as both 
strength and weakness. On the one hand, these different energy systems have contributed 
significantly to urban development and the diversity of RE systems offers RECs a flexible set 
of RE technologies matching context-specific requirements. The megatrend of digitalisation in 
particular, previously identified as a landscape driver, opens possibilities for smart energy 
supply through smart metering with the potential to increase energy efficiency.122 
On the other hand, the afore-mentioned specialisation of RE technology is accompanied by 
increasing complexity. In addition, once established, existing energy supply systems are 
difficult to alter.123 Furthermore, despite the afore-mentioned efficiency gains, digitalisation 
also consumes an increasing amount of energy through data transmission and connected devices. 
In 2017, the share such data centres and networks in global electricity demand was roughly 2 
percent and is yet to increase. Hence, energy efficiency improvements are needed in the IT 
sector as well.124 
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Another major advantage of RE is that RE technologies are compatible with any electricity 
system, ranging from large grids with continental scope to small networks in energy 
autonomous buildings.125 The volatility of RE sources, however, remains a crucial challenge.126 
To cushion peaks, for instance in times of solar energy surplus or supply bottlenecks in windless 
hours, development of battery storage is crucial. Yet, the price for battery storage is high, and 
large-scale deployment in utilities has only begun, which means that economies of scale are yet 
to be awaited. 127  Generally, technology development suffers from under-investment, 
presumably because the development of RE technology primarily addresses the public sector, 
which reduces incentives for actors in the private sector to invest in the RE industry.128  
This section has provided an overview of key elements in the international energy regime, 
which are summarised in Table 1. However, it should be noted that due to the limited scope of 
this thesis, only major trends were highlighted in this section, mainly derived from the afore-
mentioned reference literature. Nevertheless, this section was able to show that the MLP 
approach potentially allows for a comprehensive overview of key regime elements reflecting 
the status quo of the global energy sector, although this would require an extensive literature 
review and time resources. 
Table 1 Overview of elements in the international energy regime. (Own table) 
Culture Industry Markets and 
user 
preferences 
Policy Science Technology 
• Increased 
public 
awareness 
• Values and 
norms 
• Acceptance 
vs conflicts 
• Incumbent 
utilities 
• Economies 
of scales 
• Decentralis
ation 
• Liberalisa-
tion 
• Economic 
incentives 
• Up-front 
and 
switching 
costs 
• Higher RE 
prices 
• High 
LCOE  
• User 
insecurities 
• NDCs 
• National 
reduction 
targets 
• Hard and 
soft 
institutions 
• Monopoly-
centred 
• Lack of 
data 
• Skills 
shortage 
• Under-
investment 
• Inappropria
te IP laws 
• Limited 
benefits for 
innovators 
• Efficiency 
gains 
• Compati-
bility of 
RE 
• Smart 
energy 
• Long life-
cycles 
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3.1.3. Niches in the international socio-technical energy system 
Worldwide, there are numerous cities, communities and regions which are either on their way 
to become 100 percent renewable or have already achieved this goal. International organisations 
and initiatives have published lists of 100 percent RE cities and communities, such as the Ready 
for 100 campaign by Sierra Club, an environmental organisation in the US, the global platform 
Global 100% RE and the Carbon Disclosure Project.129 Other international initiatives are E-C 
Energie-Cités in Europe, the Green Cities programme, and the Cities for Climate Protection 
campaign by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI).130 Apart 
from these international, mostly voluntary initiatives, many academic articles have dealt in-
depth with the design and the implementation of various RECs as well. 
This section will compile a multi-case report on seven international case studies, drawing upon 
single case studies on Graz, Freiburg and Murau (Späth and Rohracher 2010; 2012 and 
Rohracher and Späth 2014), on Feldheim (Kunze and Busch 2011; Busch and McCormick 2014) 
as well as on Güssing, Helsinki, Jühnde and Mureck (Radzi 2012). Table 2 gives an overview 
of the selected cases and the type of their REC. Noticeably, the location of the selected cases is 
concentrated on European countries with a predominant representation of RECs in Germany 
and Austria. Nevertheless, the selection is not based on the RECs’ location but rather on the 
availability of comprehensive documentation. The case studies by Radzi (2012), Kunze and 
Busch (2011) and Busch and McCormick (2014) cover detailed records on the evolution and 
implementation processes of RECs, while Späth and Rohracher (2010; 2012) and Rohracher 
and Späth (2014) employed specific aspects of the MLP. The selected case studies in this thesis 
have already been completed, which allows assessing their developments in light of their results. 
Originally, Radzi’s (2012) case studies covered 14 RECs in total. However, to maintain 
comparability across the cases, this multi-case report excludes energy autonomous islands and 
larger regions and focuses on cities and villages instead. With sufficient similarities to be 
comparable and sufficient differences to complement each other, this sample attempts to 
represent a compilation of varying niche formation processes. 
The multi-case report will begin by describing the initiation of the afore-mentioned cases in 
order to determine whether the niches evolved by strategic selection or local initiatives. This 
criterion also aims at comprehending motivations driving governments to promote RECs in the 
context of SNM. To assess to what extent stronger stakeholder participation is congruent with 
independent niche development, this thesis will proceed with the criterion stakeholder 
participation. Based on the assumption that stronger government interference means that SNM 
was employed, the analysis will apply the criterion government involvement in the next step. 
Yet, integrating Heilmann’s (2008) criticism towards an overly sharp distinction between 
bottom-up and top-down, the analysis will consider the relationship between MLP and SNM as 
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a continuum and determine the position of the respective RECs on it. A fourth criterion, the 
function of the niche, will compare the niche developments with the four-phase model proposed 
by Geels (2004) (see chapter 2.1.3), which will allow at the same time to determine influences 
of SNM on the niche development. Subsequently, the report will summarise the findings and 
conclude with an analysis of the different dynamics behind niche development. 
Table 2 Overview of selected cases and projects. (Own table) 
Case Project 
Graz, Austria Eco-city aiming to reduce GHG emissions by 50 percent, 
replacing fossil fuels with solar thermal energy and energy 
contracting models for the investment in energy efficiency 
Güssing, Austria Güssing model for phasing out fossil fuels, reducing energy 
consumption and supplying the town with biomass and solar 
energy 
Feldheim, Germany First German energy self-sufficient village, relying on biomass, 
wind energy and solar energy 
Freiburg, Germany Energy Supply Concept for reducing energy consumption, 
increasing the share of RE and phasing out nuclear energy 
Helsinki, Finland Eco-Viikki, Finland’s first ecological residential area, relying 
on solar energy 
Jühnde, Germany Bioenergy Village, completely relying on biomass for 
electricity and heating 
Murau, Austria Energy Region, self-sufficient electricity and heating based on 
bioenergy 
Initiation 
The initiation of the RECs varies greatly. Whereas some were initiated top-down by 
government ministries, others emerged on the initiative of local stakeholders. A top-down 
example is the construction of Eco-Viikki, a Finnish experimentation area for environment-
friendly housing, which was initiated by the Ministry of Environment in cooperation with the 
Finnish Association of Architects (SAFA).131 In the case of Graz, the impulse came bottom-up 
from engaged local residents, who were active in local politics and established relations with 
the municipal administration, as well as with energy experts in both the city administration and 
the technical university. Before its efforts to become renewable, the city had been plagued by 
bad air quality, a landscape element which pressured the socio-technical regime of Graz.132 In 
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Freiburg, the bottom-up nature of the local energy transition is even more pronounced, coming 
from civil protests against coal-fired and nuclear energy.133 
Nevertheless, driving forces behind RECs cannot always be distinguished as either top-down 
or bottom-up. Rather, RECs may emerge in between or outside this continuum as well. For 
instance, the transition towards energy self-sufficiency in Feldheim began with the installation 
of wind turbines in 1994, subsequently involved additional RE technologies such as solar PV 
and biomass energy, until it resulted in an interconnected energy system of households and the 
energy grid.134 Because it was the local company ‘Energiequelle’ that had approached the 
municipality with the request to install wind turbines, this form of initiation can neither be 
classified as bottom-up nor top-down, but it should be understood as a hybrid form.135 Similarly, 
the local transition in Güssing emerged at an intermediate level between bottom-up and top-
down, as the decision to transition towards RE was made jointly by the mayor, the town’s 
electrical engineer, and the head of the local timber growers association. 136  In Murau, a 
heterogeneous team composed of the head of the local energy agency, a professional facilitator 
of participatory processes and a group of energy activists initiated the local transformation into 
an Energy Region.137 Local energy transition can also be induced by research institutes, such 
as the Bioenergy Village in Jühnde, which was initiated by the Interdisciplinary Centre for 
Sustainable Development (IZNE) in 1998 on behalf of the universities in Göttingen and 
Kassel.138 
However, analysing the extent to which such niches are instigated bottom-up, top-down or at 
an intermediate level does not yet suffice to determine if they develop instinctively or in the 
context of SNM. Therefore, the next two criteria will highlight niche designs with regard to 
stakeholder participation and government influence in order to assess whether these niches are 
being steered actively. 
Stakeholder participation 
The designated role of stakeholders in the design of niches is equally diverse. Local 
stakeholders play a crucial role for the niche development, as the case of Helsinki shows. Eco-
Viikki presumably missed its energy and heat consumption targets because technical knowledge 
was not transferred onto local actors, which impeded the appropriate maintenance of the 
deployed technologies and led to inefficiencies.139 Instead, the seminars and workshops that 
Eco-Viikki held were primarily targeted at building experts.140 The pilot project would have 
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allowed for a significant potential of user experiences to improve the integration of RE 
technologies in the residential area. However, this potential had remained untapped, although 
residents were eager to contribute to a more sustainable environment. 141 Yet, the original 
concept of Eco-Viikki allowed residents room to shape the eco-community to a certain extent. 
For instance, resident groups composed of three to five families could apply for a bidding 
competition with their concepts of ‘self-build projects’, given that the groups were represented 
by at least one building expert. In addition, the construction of Eco-Viikki was accompanied 
with numerous blank spaces, which residents filled subsequently with self-managed gardens.142 
As result of incomplete stakeholder management, overall feedback by residents was mixed, 
ranging from ‘This is really a wonderful home for someone such as me’ to ‘A nice place, badly 
built’.143 
In Murau, stakeholder participation played a more important role already in the concept. The 
Energy Region began with a workshop, in which 30 participants from local energy organisations 
brainstormed on the regional status quo and the desired future. During moderated discussions, 
participants could openly voice concerns and suggestions. Also, all of them participated in 
selecting priorities, which were then consolidated in the common vision of an energy 
autonomous Murau.144 Workshops proved to be a common method to increase stakeholder 
acceptance and to transfer knowledge. In Jühnde, workshops aimed at educating village groups 
and empowering them to become prosumers, i.e. users who both generate and consume energy, 
through active participation in the production of bioenergy. 145  Besides, stakeholders were 
invited to participate in village meetings and roundtables, planning workshops and working 
groups. In addition, social activities were organised, such as festivals and contests for painting 
and running. Along with increased income, new employment and the dissemination of 
knowledge, sound stakeholder management had a positive impact on villagers’ satisfaction.146 
In Güssing, stakeholders have assumed indispensable responsibilities. For more than 15 years, 
local farmers supplied residents with biomass energy and to date local heat networks are 
operated by inhabitants.147 To institutionalise knowledge dissemination, a Solar School was 
founded which offers training for professionals and students alike. Altogether, community 
involvement was one of the crucial pillars for the successful transition of Güssing.148 
The case of Feldheim demonstrates a particularly intensive form of stakeholder participation. 
As Vattenfall, the provincial grid-monopolist, denied providing grid infrastructure for the 
village’s wind turbines, Feldheim decided to construct a new and independent grid. Connecting 
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to the new grid required households to invest a lump sum of 1,500 EUR in exchange for an 
energy price guarantee for the following ten years.149 At the same time, Energiequelle offered 
shared ownership to local stakeholders for its energy installations. 150  During the project 
implementation, diverse expert groups composed of local stakeholders assumed the 
responsibility for specific aspects. Based on their skills, this form of labour division further 
contributed to knowledge dissemination.151 In addition, stakeholder management in Feldheim 
was not limited to stakeholder participation in energy installations. Energiequelle also engaged 
actively in social life, sponsoring village fairs and maintaining streets and side-walks, as well 
as technical equipment for the local football pitch. Furthermore, the company created jobs, 
ensured reliable energy prices, supported social life and contributed to climate change 
mitigation. Altogether, the company’s efforts to support residents’ social life in Feldheim 
improved ‘social cohesion’ and strengthened ‘local identity’ in the community.152  
Government influence 
Government entities participating in the niche development of the afore-mentioned cases were 
mainly municipal bodies. For instance, the municipal council of Freiburg reacted to local 
protests by designing an ‘energy supply concept’ to save energy and increase the share of RE, 
while phasing out nuclear energy completely. Throughout the further development, the 
municipality of Freiburg contributed actively to promoting energy-saving technologies for 
heating and power. Besides, it imposed standards concerning insulation and energy-efficient 
buildings, which proved to be particularly effective.153 
The project in Güssing was partly financed by the Austrian government and the local 
government of Burgenland, and in addition the project could mobilise EU funds. Apart from 
financial support, there was no other significant contribution from the regime level. 154 In 
Jühnde, the role of government bodies was limited to funding as well. For Jühnde’s Bioenergy 
Village, the major share of funds was contributed by the former German Ministry of Food 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV) and the German Agency of Renewable 
Resources (FNR), while state and municipal governments sponsored the rest. The responsibility 
of the municipal and district councils in Jühnde was to supervise the planning process, along 
with representatives from clubs and associations, the church, university groups and other 
planning groups. Hence, government bodies did not play a dominant role for the niche 
development in Jühnde.155 
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There were two cases in which the central government interfered. In Feldheim, the lack of laws 
regulating ownership structures for Feldheim’s independent energy grid forced the German 
Federal Government to take actions and to establish an appropriate legal framework.156 This 
case exemplifies at the same time, how niche dynamics can enforce changes on the regime level. 
Selected by the Finnish Ministry of Environment and SAFA, Eco-Viikki was established in the 
context of the Climate Change Conference in Rio and the Kyoto Agreement. It is thus connected 
to international efforts to mitigate climate change. Reacting to the government’s demand for 
this ecological experimentation area, Eco-Viikki was predominantly initiated and developed by 
the City of Helsinki. The project concept already conceived the sole installation of solar energy, 
which was possible since all buildings were yet to be constructed. 157  Throughout the 
development of the experimental area, the municipality relied on funding by the Finnish 
Ministry of Environment and the National Technology Agency of Finland (Tekes), a 
governmental funding agency.158 The Finnish government’s strong involvement in the project 
is further demonstrated by the fact that it possessed one third of the available plot area for Eco-
Viiki. Hence, prior to the construction of buildings, the municipality had to negotiate with the 
state. The State Real Property Institute then sold the plots to the building developers. 159 
According to Radzi (2012), the government’s motive to own land plots in Eco-Viikki was to 
‘maintain control over development and promote environmental quality’.160 Altogether, the 
evolution of Eco-Viikki strongly leads to the conclusion that the experiment had been 
established in the context of SNM. 
In all of the afore-mentioned examples, local government bodies have provided crucial support 
for the niche development. However, government influence can also have negative effects. In 
the cases of Graz and Freiburg, institutions, policies, interests on and actors on various 
administrative levels proved to be obstacles to niche dynamics.161 The niche development in 
Graz suffered from the introduction of partial privatisation of energy utilities, which diminished 
the active influence of the municipality on the city’s energy system, and the circumstance that 
key actors in the city administration left due to a financial scandal. The city administration of 
Freiburg faced strong resistance from provincial authorities with regard to expanding installed 
capacities of RE.162 In Güssing, legal problems related to EU funding, which occurred during 
the implementation phase, had severe impacts on the project progress. 163 These examples 
illustrate at the same time how institutions from the regime level, i.e. elements related to policy, 
can challenge the niche development. 
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Function of the niche 
To determine which role the niches played in the broader context of the MLP, one can refer to 
Geels’ (2004) description of the four phases in niche development as outlined in chapter 2.1.3. 
In the first phase, a technological innovation emerges to solve a local problem. This can be 
observed in Güssing, where increasing fuel debts resulting from a strong dependence on fuel 
imports had forced the municipality to transition towards RE.164 In Graz, poor air quality on the 
landscape level had mobilised residents in the local niche to advocate RE, putting pressure on 
the existing socio-technical regime. To a more extreme extent, the city of Freiburg turned to 
RE after engaged inhabitants of Freiburg rose up against the planned construction of a nuclear 
energy plant nearby in the mid-1970s. These two cases show that stakeholder groups such as 
experts or environmental activists, as well as actor networks connected to the local 
administration can build up significant momentum for change on the niche level.165 
At the core of the second phase is the formation of niche communities composed of experts and 
other relevant stakeholders, which jointly contribute to further improvements of the innovation. 
Such niche communities were found in several case studies as well. In Freiburg, for instance, 
individuals from different organisations, such as research institutes, lobbies or businesses 
contributed ideas for an alternative energy system. In addition, Freiburg’s population had many 
well-informed citizens, who expressed their thoughts in letters and petitions. 166  A similar 
network was built in Graz, where engaged residents proactively connected with stakeholders in 
local politics, the city administration and the technical university.167 Murau Energy Region 
already enshrined the strategic establishment of such a niche community in the project concept, 
which was supposed to represent stakeholders from different backgrounds. Yet, the initial niche 
community was able to initiate a snowball effect, motivating more stakeholders to participate 
in the niche development. Subsequently, various subgroups focused on specific targets and 
strategies to become 100 percent renewable, facilitated by the fact that citizens in Murau were 
well-connected to other relevant stakeholders or businesses. 168  The Güssing model 
institutionalised such a niche community by a European Centre for Renewable Energy (EEE) 
to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technologies. In the EEE, a ‘team of highly trained 
technicians and international scientists’ gathers to engage in further research on RE.169 As 
highlighted previously, the implementation of Feldheim’s path towards energy self-sufficiency 
relied largely on the participation of expert groups as well, which cooperated with other 
stakeholders to share skills and knowledge.170 A similar form of niche community can be found 
in Jühnde’s working groups for the local Bioenergy Village, in which 22 percent of house 
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owners were willing to engage to support the implementation.171 The only case which does not 
apply to this phase was Eco-Viiki, which refrained from involving residents in the niche 
development despite their significant potential for feedback. 
In the third phase, the innovation improves in terms of price-performance ratio and 
compatibility with existing structures as to enhance its competitiveness. Since most cases 
received funding or subsidies, the projects did not have to engage in such improvements. Rather, 
costs were reduced externally through financial support. Though not constituting an 
improvement of cost effectiveness and compatibility in the original sense, the population of 
Jühnde ensured that the generation of bioenergy matched local price structures. Costs of energy 
generation were consequently adapted to price levels of conventional energy generation, while 
preventing income losses for local farmers at the same time. 172 In Güssing, the transition 
towards RE itself embodied an improved price performance ratio, given that the town had been 
struggling with amassing debts for fuel imports. Through energy saving measures and a ban on 
fossil fuel usage in public buildings alone, Güssing was able to cut energy expenditures by 50 
percent within two years. The construction of a biomass gasification power plant further 
reduced energy costs for local consumers, with feed-in tariffs cushioning the high costs for 
biomass feedstock.173  
Interestingly, the case of Feldheim stands out not because it achieved economic and 
technological improvements, but because it developed parallel structures which cannot be 
assessed with the perspective of price-performance improvements and technical compatibility. 
Relying on an independent grid, self-sufficient Feldheim does not need to enhance the 
competitiveness of the deployed RE technologies at all. However, another feature of the third 
phase is the emergence of imitators or competitors attempting to copy the innovation, which 
applies to some of the RECs. Building upon its experiences as an Energy Region, the project 
developers from Murau were involved in the establishment of other RECs in Austria and 
engaged in knowledge dissemination internationally.174 Furthermore, the successful transition 
towards self-sufficiency in Jühnde spilled over onto 30 villages in the region, which aspire to 
become self-sufficient as well.175 In addition, Graz, Freiburg, Murau were awarded national 
and international prizes, which makes them potential role models for other RECs as well.176 
Nevertheless, due to a lack of relevant observations in the original case studies, it remains 
unclear if there were further improvements in terms of technological price-performance ratio. 
Hence, future research may attempt to comprehend which effects the introduction of RE had 
on local economic structures and in how far costs related to RE were improved. 
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The fourth phase describes the complete replacement of the dominant technology by the 
innovation, which applies to Güssing, Feldheim, Helsinki and Jühnde. In Feldheim, the niche 
development began with the installation of a few wind turbines and expanded through the 
integration of solar and biomass energy. Forced to construct an independent grid, Feldheim 
ultimately became energy self-sufficient. Whereas Güssing successively expanded the share of 
RE in the local energy mix to halt its dependence on fuel imports, Eco-Viiki in Helsinki was 
designed as 100 percent renewable from the beginning, with solar energy supposed to cover the 
energy demand of the residents. The Bioenergy Village in Jühnde was originally established to 
explore the potentials of bioenergy, where it could build upon favourable conditions since a) 
there were abundant biomass resources and b) the major part of households was already 
connected to the grid. By installing a biomass and a biogas plant, the transition towards 100 
percent RE was completed. With the exception of slacks in the availability of RE sources, hydro, 
wind, solar and biomass energy were able to make Murau energy self-sufficient as well.177 
The only two cases which did not complete the fourth phase are Graz and Freiburg. This is most 
likely because these two cases constitute larger cities, as opposed to the other cases, where the 
transition to RE took place at a village or community level. According to media reports, energy 
self-sufficiency is piloted the first time in a district of Graz, indicating that Graz as a city cannot 
yet rely on RE completely.178 Freiburg intends to become energy self-sufficient under the 
overarching goal to become climate neutral by 2050.179 Table 3 provides an overview of the 
European sample in view of completed niche development phases. However, as before, a 
comprehensive analysis would require continuous observations on the technological structures 
in each case to evaluate if dominant technological configurations had been completely replaced 
by RE. 
Table 3 Niche development phases in the selected cases. (Own table) 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Graz X X   
Güssing X X X X 
Feldheim X X n.a. X 
Freiburg X X   
Helsinki    X 
Jühnde  X X X 
Murau  X  X 
Yet, opinions on the question whether all afore-mentioned RECs constitute niche experiments 
diverge. Instead of instigating broader system transitions, some cases may have been designed 
to prove the mere feasibility of certain technologies and indicate possibilities to integrate them 
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into alternative configurations. Nevertheless, they may play important roles for preparing future 
transitions. Murau Energy Region, for example, did not primarily serve as a protected space for 
the development and maturation of technological innovation, but rather aimed at improving 
frameworks to better incorporate existing technologies to facilitate their expansion.180 Similarly, 
the Bioenergy Village in Jühnde was initiated to explore capacities of bioenergy, with a focus 
on technical feasibility of the technology as well. 
In addition, the REC initiatives in Freiburg and Graz have shown to diverge from the traditional 
‘niche-regime dichotomy’ for similar reasons. Firstly, neither of the two cities created protected 
space for technological experimentation, thus they did not engage in niche formation in the 
stricter sense. Secondly, the socio-technical regimes of Freiburg and Graz did not necessarily 
come up with completely new configurations, but rather merged with elements from the old 
system, i.e. not all elements were replaced and energy systems involving different energy 
sources coexist. Thirdly, resulting configurations of these eco-cities were designed to be copied 
by other municipalities instead of entering the regime level to induce a broader shift on that 
eventually permeating the entire socio-technical system.181 
However, this thesis argues that the previous arguments do not necessarily contradict the logic 
of niche development. By attracting a growing number of imitators, as it was the case in Graz, 
Freiburg, Jühnde and Murau, RECs can gradually increase their momentum and create 
multiplier effects as well. Not least because Graz, Freiburg and Jühnde received awards for 
their efforts, such RECs can gain recognition from actors and institutions on the regime level, 
which may enable their model to enter the regime. This argument is further supported by Späth 
and Rohracher (2012), who admit that these RECs provide fruitful ground for innovations with 
the potential to pave the way for more radical innovations.182 
The selected sample of RECs delivers a set of different niche features in RECs. With the 
methodological groundwork for the assessment of socio-technical energy systems and first 
insights from case studies, section 3.2 will proceed with the evaluation of the Chinese 
counterpart, before comparing the results of the two analyses in section 3.3. to explore if and 
how RECs evolve differently in the Chinese socio-technical energy system. 
3.2. China’s socio-technical energy system 
Having assessed current dynamics in the international energy system throughout chapter 3.1, 
this section will proceed with the Chinese energy system. As discussed above, the MLP can be 
used to look at the Chinese energy sector in two ways, either as an individual socio-technical 
energy system or as a sub-system within the global energy system. Since the overarching global 
energy system has already been assessed, the Chinese energy system will be treated as an 
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individual entity upon which the MLP will be applied. Hereby, this thesis attempts to a) figure 
out with which similarities and differences the Chinese energy system is embedded in the global 
system and b) why and in how far the role of the niche in China differs from the original niche 
understanding. Following the previous structure, this chapter will first investigate to what extent 
dynamics in the global socio-technical energy landscape can be found on the Chinese landscape 
before comparing elements in the global socio-technical regime with its Chinese counterpart. 
The analysis of the niche level will be based on two case studies of 100 percent renewable 
community projects in Tongli New Energy Town (TNET) in Jiangsu province and the 
Sunflower Project in Shaanxi province to assess the function of such RE pilot projects. Finally, 
the results of the comparative analysis will be presented in section 3.3. 
3.2.1. China’s socio-technical energy landscape 
The Chinese socio-technical energy landscape faces similar pressure to the rest of the 
international community. The key trend in the Chinese landscape is continued urbanisation. 
With an urbanisation rate of 56.1 percent in 2015, which is estimated to increase to 63 percent 
in 2020, urbanisation poses a significant challenge to the nation, as more than one billion people 
are expected to live in Chinese cities by 2020.183 The anticipated urban agglomeration will 
confront the Chinese energy infrastructure with higher capacity requirements in both urban and 
rural areas, having to provide enough energy for densely populated metropoles, while ensuring 
energy access in sparsely populated and remote areas at the same time. A different narrative on 
China’s development in the energy sector purports that the country’s rapid economic 
development was able to lift a substantial part of the population out of (energy) poverty, which 
resulted in a surging demand for energy sources as well. This was particularly relevant for 
fossil-fuels, since the country’s fast economic and industrial development preliminarily was 
built on coal.184 A common ground in both narratives is the fact that energy consumption per 
capita in China has grown parallel to the urbanisation rate. 185  However, economic and 
demographic trends are unevenly spread across provinces and regions and concentrated in the 
eastern provinces, which account for 35 percent of the Chinese population. Consequently, the 
major share of the domestic energy demand comes from the industrial coastal provinces 
Shandong, Hebei and Jiangsu in the East of China.186 Similar to the global energy landscape, 
progressive digitalisation has manifested in a higher energy demand in China. This trend is 
closely connected to an increasing electrification of end-uses. By raising the energy demand, 
this development will reflect on CO2 emissions as well.187  
                                                          
183 Deutsche Energie-Agentur 2018a; Long et al. 2018, p. 93. 
184 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 472. 
185 Long et al. 2018, p. 93. 
186 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 482. 
187 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 556. 
39 
 
Resource scarcity is another crucial driver of energy policy. In China, coal shortage has a 
particularly strong effect on the energy sector. Consequently, the Chinese government had to 
close coal-fired power plants in 2008, giving impetus to the promotion of wind energy instead. 
Along with a sustained growth in energy demand, China has been struggling with a significant 
dependence on coal, gas and oil imports (see chapter 2.2.2). Having evolved over a long period 
of time, this dependence cannot be seen as a mere regime element. Rather, it has been 
recognised as both an industrial and political risk, which exerts substantial pressure on the 
Chinese energy regime.188 The expansion of RE technologies in China promises to curb this 
dependence on energy imports.189 Yet, China remains a major player also on the global fossil 
fuel market with a share of nearly 50 percent in global coal production and consumption. In 
addition, China has assumed a leading position in global oil imports and an increasing role in 
global gas markets.190 Although the Chinese energy industry saw progress in decreasing its 
reliance on coal, carbon emissions in China nevertheless increased due to increased energy 
demand from the secondary industry, another driver on the landscape level.191 
Simultaneously, the Chinese energy mix must become cleaner. The current energy consumption 
pattern has resulted in severe environmental and climate problems such as deteriorated air 
quality, which affect the health of the Chinese population and have manifested in significant 
economic costs.192 Yet, the domestic energy demand is set to rise, resulting from a combination 
of different factors. A faster growth of electricity demand ‘due to the improved economy’193 
has been identified as one factor. Pressure on China comes also from the international 
community of states, who expect the largest CO2 emitter worldwide to comply with its NDCs 
formulated after the COP21. 194 The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement affects the 
Chinese energy landscape as well. Yet, China may be able to benefit from this, taking the lead 
in the development of clean energies.195 
All these developments exemplify how landscape trends become powerful drivers, pressuring 
the regime to embrace RE. While certain regime elements facilitate the expansion of RE, other 
elements still pose obstacles for the country’s energy transition. These elements will be 
described in the next section. 
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3.2.2. China’s socio-technical energy regime 
Culture 
Cultural factors influencing China’s readiness to embrace the energy transition are difficult to 
assess and prone to speculation. For instance, Gallagher (2013) traces the acceptance of the 
Chinese population to RE back to a historically rooted long-term orientation. Accordingly, she 
claims that the Chinese population cares as much about the long-term future as it cares about 
the country’s long history. Together with the planning tradition of the Communist Party, these 
cultural values manifest in ‘[…] a long-term renewable energy plan and […] relatively large 
and steady investments in renewable energy.’196 
From the residents’ perspective, an online survey of urban residents in 31 Chinese cities has 
provided a characterisation of their energy consumption awareness and behaviour, which is 
shaped by ‘traditional energy-saving habits, educational background and work environment, 
energy saving information from social networks, economic concerns, and comparison with 
neighbours’.197 Traditional energy-saving habits hint to practices such as turning of heating and 
cooling when not needed as well as opening windows for ventilation. These habits are distorted 
by technologies which require to be turned on permanently or ventilation systems which require 
windows to stay closed.198 Another theory purports that Chinese homes shape family’s identity 
to a significant extent. As a result of self-expression, homes are spaces to ‘display personal 
success and wealth’, with implications for energy consumption behaviours as well.199 
Generally, the environmental awareness of the Chinese population has increased in recent years, 
illustrated by the example of Beijing residents, who have reportedly gained a deeper 
understanding of the city’s pollution.200 In addition, a survey in Chongqing has shown that 
residents are aware of China’s need for an energy transition, but lack knowledge on concrete 
energy-saving actions at home. Furthermore, they were uninformed about relevant government 
policies, indicating that such information needs to be disseminated more comprehensively.201 
Industry 
From a macro-economic perspective, the Chinese economy has been leaving the old growth 
model with its focus on heavy industry behind, while incrementally shifting towards ‘domestic 
consumption, higher value-added manufacturing and services’202 instead. China’s industrial 
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sector accounts for the largest share of domestic energy consumption, nowadays accounting for 
roughly 50 percent of China’s total final energy consumption.203 Moving away from low-value 
production activities towards a stronger emphasis on the commercial and services sector will 
enable the Chinese industry to save CO2 emissions. DES will benefit as well, as large power 
loads to operate factories will be replaced by smaller, more distributed energy loads to supply 
office buildings and ‘smaller industrial facilities’.204 Indeed, this economic shift, along with 
increased efforts to improve energy efficiency, has already translated into slower energy 
demand growth. While energy demand has grown at 8 percent annually between 2000 and 2010, 
it has slowed down to 3 percent since 2010. Also, along with the expansion of RE in China, the 
Chinese industry has been able to reduce its use of coal and oil.205 
As highlighted earlier, Asia is among the continents in which the dominance of monopolies in 
the energy sector is most prevalent.206 This applies to the Chinese energy sector as well. Before 
the latest reforms, the Chinese energy system was characterized by close government control 
and the dominance of a few incumbent enterprises. Government authorities were responsible 
for pricing electricity generation, as well as determining maximum yearly operation hours for 
power plants.207 The State Grid Corporation of China (in the following abbreviated as ‘State 
Grid’) is not only the largest public utility in China but it owns and manages energy assets 
worldwide, such as in the Philippines, Brazil, Portugal, Australia, Italy and Greece. It was 
founded as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in 2002 and is in charge of the investment in as well 
as construction and operation of power grids.208 Nowadays, the energy industry is dominated 
by 20 SOEs, which originated from former ministries. These energy SOEs own and operate the 
majority of generation assets, obligating generators to sell their generated energy either to State 
Grid or Southern China Power grid, the two ‘single buyer[s] and retailer[s] of electricity within 
their respective control areas’.209 Although not explicitly asking for a liberalisation of energy 
generation, the IEA suggests to ‘level the playing field for DES in China and unlock the DES 
contribution to China’s energy transition’ through relevant reforms in the fields such as 
electricity system.210 This suggests that the dominance of these two grid operators may pose an 
obstacle for the expansion of distributed energy. The central government seems to acknowledge 
this obstacle, announcing to liberalise the market for DES on the side of the users as to offer 
fair access to the grid, while reforming the operation mode of grid enterprises.211 The exact 
extent to which the influence of the incumbent grid operators shall be limited remains unclear. 
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Markets and user preferences 
China plays a leading role in the global market for RE technologies, spearheading the export of 
solar equipment as well as the development of a major subset of low-carbon technologies. 
Regarding installed capacities for hydropower, wind energy and solar PV power, China ranks 
first worldwide. In addition, Chinese companies increasingly invest in international energy 
projects.212  
With regard to DES, countries worldwide have recognised the economic potential of distributed 
energy, including China. As a result, new business models in the field of DES are increasingly 
offering users a diversified set of energy services rather than just energy alone.213 Examples of 
such business models include prosumer models and energy service companies (ESCO) models. 
In the prosumer model, users become both energy consumers and producers. Modular DES 
installations allow covering energy demand of private households, communities or industrial 
parks. Prosumers can feed excess energy into the central grid in exchange for remuneration. In 
the ESCO model, distributed energy developers supply consumers with energy. These ESCOs 
can cooperate with multiple partners, including utilities, equipment manufacturers and 
technology providers. 214 
However, research on the user perspective has identified a mismatch between RE technologies 
and user preferences. Hu et al. (2017) found that there is a gap between policy-making and 
technological design of RE technologies and the actual energy consumption behaviour of 
China’s urban population. This mismatch can lead to inaccurate technology recommendations, 
e.g. for heating technologies. For example, whereas experts and media reports strongly advocate 
technologies for centralised space heating, this may not reflect user preferences but lead to 
inefficient energy use and higher costs for residents instead.215  
Policy 
Similar to the global socio-technical energy regime, Chinese energy policy has seen an 
increased public and institutional awareness of the need of an energy transition.216 The Chinese 
government has recognised the severity of environmental and health problems arising from the 
dominance of fossil fuels and has become increasingly active in adapting policy-making to the 
need for a more sustainable domestic energy system. 
China’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016 has demonstrated the country’s ambitions 
to contribute to global efforts for climate change mitigation. In its NDCs, the country has 
committed to ‘peak carbon emissions no later than 2030, increase non-fossil fuels to 20 percent 
                                                          
212 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 471. 
213 International Energy Agency 2017a, p. 12. 
214 International Energy Agency 2017a, p. 45; International Energy Agency 2017a, p. 48. 
215 Hu et al. 2017, p. 19. 
216 Fischer 2018, p. 8. 
43 
 
of the energy mix, and reduce carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 
60 to 65 percent from 2005 levels by 2030.’217 The Chinese NDCs encompass goals such as 
building a ‘low carbon energy system’, which purports to curb domestic coal consumption 
while promoting natural gas, hydro power, nuclear power, solar power, geothermal energy, bio-
energy as well as maritime energy. They include the expansion of distributed energy in 
combination with smart grids too.218 
Commitments to contribute to reduce energy-related emissions have also manifested in national 
policies. Main institutions in Chinese energy policy are the National Energy Agency (NEA), 
which formulates energy-related FYPs and other, quantitative targets as well as regulations for 
the energy transition. Other relevant ministries include the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), responsible for the ‘macro-management of manufacturing capacity on 
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind turbines’, the Ministry of Finance, responsible for 
budget and subsidies, as well as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) for overseas projects.219 
Acknowledging the need to optimise the domestic energy sector, multiple official documents 
have been released on different administrative levels. On a website called China Climate 
Change Info-Net, the National Centre for Climate Change Strategy and International 
Cooperation has collected laws and regulations related to climate change mitigation.220 Apart 
from the regulations listed there, other policies and guidelines published already during the 
period of the 12th FYP (2011-2015), for instance, include the Work Plan for Controlling 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, the Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and 
Emission Reduction, the 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction 
and the 2014-2015 Action Plan for Energy Conservation.221 
The 13th FYP (2016-2020) dedicates an entire section to the energy transition. It announces that 
China will build ‘a modern energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient, and will 
safeguard the country’s energy security.’ Whereas the 13th FYP pledges support for projects 
related to ‘main power grids and trans-regional power transmission routes’222, there are few 
signs of an official intention to promote local energy generation. Such signs can be found in the 
government’s commitment to promote the expansion of distributed energy systems (DES) as 
well as support for key technologies relevant for DES.223 Also, one may recognize subtle hints 
behind phrases such as ‘[c]oordinate the development of end-use markets and power 
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transmission routes’ and ‘[a]ccelerate the development of dispersed wind power and distributed 
photovoltaic power […]’. These measures implicitly express the intention to involve the local 
level more deeply in the national energy transition. Yet, the goal for distributed energy has a 
clear focus on the sources of RE rather than the local organisation of RE generation. Overall, 
the 13th FYP emphasises larger, trans-regional energy projects such as transmission routes and 
large power plants over the support for local energy projects. 224  This could suggest that 
decision-making for the local organisation of the energy transition is directly passed onto 
energy-related official authorities and lower administrative levels. 
More emphasis on distributed energy can be found in documents such as the National 
Innovation and Action Plan for the Energy Technology Revolution, jointly released by the 
NDRC and the National Energy Agency (NEA). In this document, distributed energy 
constitutes one of the focus areas for technological development, together with power storage, 
smart grids and energy savings in industry, buildings and transport. Concrete measures for the 
promotion of distributed energy include improvements of storage capacities for distributed 
micro-grids. By 2050, DES shall be scaled up for broad use.225 
Another document released by the NDRC, the 13th FYP for Energy Development, stresses the 
development of distributed energy as well, along with smart energy supply and consumption. 
It also explicitly emphasises the role of localities and local users, saying that energy generation 
through DES will be adapted to regional conditions and thus reduce their dependence on fuel 
imports. Hence, distributed energy is supposed to contribute to regional energy self-sufficiency. 
Users, i.e. local stakeholders are supposed to both benefit from and take active part in 
distributed energy generation.226 
Science 
The afore-mentioned Innovation and Action Plan for the Energy Technology Revolution 
indicates where future research should go, with distributed energy being one of the relevant 
fields. 227  According to the Innovation and Action Plan, the Chinese energy sector lacks 
innovativeness, which is illustrated by four major challenges. Firstly, the Chinese energy sector 
relies significantly on the import of key technologies, equipment and materials, while 
indigenous RE technology development has lagged behind. Secondly, industry and research are 
too detached from each other, inhibiting the transfer of innovation to industrial processes. As a 
result, Chinese enterprises lack innovativeness. Thirdly, the Chinese innovation system needs 
to be improved by giving the market a more prominent role for the allocation of resources in 
science and technology. IP protection needs to be enhanced, along training sessions and 
management of skilled personnel. Fourthly, the Chinese energy sector lacks a long-term 
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innovation strategy which emphasises the role of science and technology.228 Although the 
Chinese government ultimately strives for independent energy innovation, in order to improve 
its innovation capacities, China will seek international research cooperation.229  
Technology 
Analogous to the global socio-technical energy regime, energy technologies in China have seen 
improvements in energy efficiency, although this includes fossil-fuel technologies as well. For 
instance, China has installed a fleet of ‘relatively efficient’ coal-fired power plants with air 
pollution controls over the past decade.230 Although the improved energy efficiency of these 
power plants can be seen as an advantage, one can also argue that their presumably extensive 
life-cycle will delay their replacement by more sustainable energy generation units, as reasoned 
in chapter 3.1.2. Yet, Chinese grids are too inefficient to absorb a large amount of RE, leading 
to significant losses through curtailment. In 2016, for instance, China had to curtail 50 terawatt 
hours (TWh) of wind energy due to limited grid capacities.231 
However, the advantages of distributed energy mentioned in chapter 3.1.2 can help overcome 
technological challenges. By promoting distributed energy, the Chinese energy regime may 
benefit from lower energy transmission losses, lower environmental pollution due to cleaner 
energy sources, reliable energy supply in remote areas, and a level playing field in the energy 
market through the entrance of decentralised energy providers.232 
By giving an overview of different trends and factors, this analysis has shown that there are 
both favourable and unfavourable regime elements in the Chinese energy sector. While official 
documents indicate that government provides guidance for multiple regime elements such as 
industry, policy and science, there remain challenges for the expansion of RE which need to be 
solved. Such challenges include, for instance, lacking knowledge of energy-saving measures 
among the population, the dominance of incumbent utilities, inaccurate technology 
recommendations, low innovativeness of Chinese enterprises and deficient IP protection for 
innovators. Table 4 summarises the identified elements in the Chinese energy regime.  
The next chapter will analyse the role of RECs in China, underpinned by two case studies. The 
first case study, the Sunflower Project in Shaanxi constitutes a grassroots initiative, whereas the 
second case, Tongli New Energy Town in Jiangsu describes a pilot project selected by 
government authorities. After analysing the development of these two niches in an analogous 
manner to chapter 3.1.3, their results will be compared and analysed in chapter 3.3. 
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Table 4 Overview of elements in the international energy regime. (Own table) 
Culture Industry Markets 
and user 
preferences 
Policy Science Technology 
• Long-term 
orientation 
• Increased 
awareness 
• Habits 
• Identity 
• Lack of 
know-how 
• Economic 
shift 
• Incumbent 
grid 
operators 
• Reliance 
on fuel 
imports 
• Market 
leader 
• New 
business 
models 
• Mismatch 
with user 
needs 
• Official 
documents 
• NDRC and 
NEA 
targets 
• Official 
focus areas 
• Lack of 
innovative-
ness 
• Improved 
energy 
efficiency 
• Inefficient 
grids 
• Benefits of 
distributed 
energy 
3.2.3. Niches in the Chinese socio-technical energy system 
Parallel to the international counterpart, the Chinese socio-technical energy system has seen an 
increased number of RECs on the niche level as well. However, as suggested in chapter 2.2.3, 
the role of Chinese RECs in the MLP is different from RECs in other countries. Differences 
range from initiation and implementation of such niche projects on the micro-level to their 
functions within the broader system on a macro-level. 
Despite the growing number of Chinese RECs, according to Lou (2013), only a small number 
of Chinese cities fulfil the conditions to become 100 percent renewable pilot cities, whereas the 
large majority of Chinese cities are unlikely to become completely renewable.233 
As mentioned previously, characteristics of RECs vary not only across countries but also within 
regions. Consequently, Chinese RECs can diverge from each other significantly. The following 
analysis of two Chinese RECs attempts to capture key similarities and differences in 
comparison with each other as well as with the international reference from chapter 3.1.3. The 
Shaanxi Sunflower Project (陕西向日葵行动) is an example of a completed renewable energy 
initiative in rural villages which was initiated bottom-up by a local Chinese non-government 
organisation, whereas Tongli New Energy Town (同里新能源小镇) is an ongoing model 
project for showcasing the integration of multiple state of the art RE technologies in one 
comprehensive energy system. In order to make the international reference, which consists of 
several case studies, and the two Chinese cases comparable, the next sections will follow the 
previous approach by focusing on the aspects initiation, government involvement, stakeholder 
participation and function of the niche after a brief introduction. 
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3.2.3.1. Shaanxi Sunflower Project 
In Shaanxi province, which is located in the centre of China, rural regions suffered from 
environmental pollution, along with increasing costs for food and energy. To curb deforestation, 
which served at supplying villagers with wood for cooking and heating, the local government 
incentivised households to keep pigs. However, the pigs produced a critical amount of methane 
and were thus both polluters of groundwater as well as a valuable source of biogas. Responding 
to these circumstances, the local civil organisation Shaanxi Volunteer Mothers Association for 
Environmental Protection (陕西省妈妈环保志愿者协会), also called Mama Huanbao (MMHB) 
developed the idea to install small biogas units in each household.234 The Sunflower Project (向
日葵行动) began in 1999 and was active in multiple villages in Shaanxi province. In 2006, 
MMHB was awarded the Ashden International Award for Sustainable Development for the 
accomplishments of the Sunflower Project. It was the first Chinese civil organisation to obtain 
this international award.235 Upon the award ceremony, Wufang Xiaowei, former director of 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) Hong Kong praised the grass-roots organisation for its achievements 
in empowering rural women and initiating an ‘energy revolution’ by improving rural pigsties, 
toilets and kitchens.236 Yet, since the latest information on relevant activity was published on 
their website at the end of 2012, it remains unclear if the initiative is still active.237 Nevertheless, 
it serves as a successfully completed example of a renewable grassroots initiative on the niche 
level. It should be noted, however, that the Sunflower Project spans across different villages in 
Shaanxi province and is thus to be seen as a renewable energy region rather than a city. 
Initiation 
The Sunflower Project was initiated by the local civil organisation MMHB in 1999. Founded 
by Wang Mingying in 1997 under the management of Shaanxi Women’s Federation, the 
MMHB’s initial mission was to contribute to afforesting the hillsides around villages in the 
province, raising money for tree planting activities.238 As a result of deforestation and over-
ploughing, the rural region had been suffering from increasing ‘desertification, frequent dust 
storms and weak springtime river flows’, and it was affected by polluted air and water.239 The 
contamination of groundwater by animal waste eventually impaired hygiene and threatened the 
health of the rural population. To address these problems, the members of MMBH decided to 
seek an alternative energy source to solve these pollution problems, which were adding to the 
financial burden of high energy costs.240 Hence, the impulse to replace the local fossil fuel-
based energy system with RE came bottom-up from civil society. Jointly with the non-
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government organisation Friends of the Earth Hong Kong, MMHB initiated the Sunflower 
Project as a regional biogas model project.241 MMHB’s first step for drafting a project concept 
was to reach out for the help of ‘local agencies and experts in the fields of farming, veterinary 
science, energy and technology.’242 
The first individual biogas installations in rural households began in seven villages in Baota, 
Yan’an in 1999.243 The methane-based biogas from the pigsties could be used in three ways, 
i.e. to fuel electricity, cooking and heating.244 Figure 9 visualises the cycle in which methane 
produced by the pigs is transformed into energy for the household. Together with human 
excrement from the toilet, the pig waste is accumulated in an underground methane reservoir, 
where it is turned into biogas through bacterial decomposition. The biogas is then ‘piped into 
the house and connected to a two-ring stove for cooking, a lamp for lighting and occasionally 
a water-heater for showers.’245 The semi-solid residue resulting from the decomposition as a 
by-product can be reused as agricultural fertiliser. Under appropriate maintenance, these biogas 
plants have a life-cycle of at least 15 years. The biogas digester, on which the biogas system is 
based was developed by a professor from Northwest Agriculture and Forest University in 
Xianyang city.246 Components of this system were manufactured in different parts of China and 
could be delivered to Shaanxi province.247   
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Figure 9 Overview of biogas usage for electricity, cooking and heating in private households.(Shaanxi Volunteer Mothers 
Association for Environmental Protection (2012)) 
Apart from installing individual biogas utilities in private households, MMHB also promoted 
public activities related to environmental protection, conducted capacity building workshops 
for women engaging in environmental protection, launched projects for the conservation of 
drinking water and for disaster relief construction, and initiated exchange with international 
environmental organisations. Their projects were not only able to supply rural households with 
clean energy, but they also improved local sanitation, pig pens, and kitchen stoves. In addition, 
improvements in local agricultural processes increased household incomes.248 
Stakeholder participation 
The Sunflower Project welcomed the participation from stakeholders in idea finding and 
decision-making throughout the entire planning and implementation process, encouraging them 
to contribute ideas from ‘initial assessment of a new plant to commissioning’.249 Already during 
the initiation of the Sunflower Project, interested local stakeholders were invited to meetings 
and workshops in which potential households were selected and educated thereafter. Under the 
guidance of experts in technology and agriculture, participants learned about ‘environment and 
health, the food chain, renewable energy, waste collection, pigsty and toilet retrofit, pipe laying 
to transmit methane, equipment operation, maintenance and repair as well as recovering residue 
for fertilizers and organic farming.’250 
A substantial part of MMHB’s work built on stakeholder empowerment. Apart from the 
installation of household biogas units, workshops and training sessions became another major 
activity of MMHB. Often, these workshops were conducted in cooperation with other Chinese 
or international NGOs and involve experts and professors.251 From 2008, MMHB cooperated 
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with Give2Asia foundation, a US-based NGO active in local communities in Asia, to offer 
workshops in 35 villages. 101 individuals were educated to take leading roles for technical 
services related to the households’ biogas units, and maintenance teams were established in 31 
villages. All in all, 236 people in 38 villages were educated to maintain their own biogas 
systems, and 1,380 individual biogas households received additional training.252 With the help 
of these workshops, local villages were provided with guidance and training which enabled 
them to manage their own biogas systems. Throughout MMHB’s activities, empowerment of 
women was particularly emphasised.253 The biogas scheme helped them to save time so that 
they could engage in, for example, social activities.254 Hence, the biogas units also improved 
their social lives. 
Local stakeholders in general perceived the private biogas systems as a convenient 
improvement, as the project reduced their daily workload and provided them with clean energy 
available on-demand.255 As Ashden (2008) observed, on-demand availability of energy ‘saves 
time collecting wood and in preparing fires for cooking. Users enjoy being able to prepare a 
meal much more quickly using biogas and not having to endure a smoky kitchen.’256 By 2006, 
1,294 biogas plants had been installed, benefitting roughly 5,200 people in total. According to 
latest accounts, MMHB helped to install biogas utilities in 2,542 households in 58 villages in 
the end.257 As a result, both the air quality in households and groundwater quality could be 
improved by reducing the concentration of carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide and dust, and 
preventing pig waste from seeping into the groundwater.258 Thus, the biogas scheme was able 
to mitigate health risks for the rural population.  
With regard to financing the installation of biogas units, households received financial support 
from both MMHB and the local government. Depending on its size and features, the price of 
an individual biogas plant ranged from 3,500 to 4,500 RMB. While the household usually paid 
one third ‘in labour and cash’259, another third was financed by local and central subsidies and 
the final third was paid by MMHB. The funding from MMHB was in turn financed by NGOs 
and international government bodies such as the German Embassy, as well as from donations 
and public fund-raising activities. 260  However, in 2006 the demand for private biogas 
installations exceeded the possible budget, so that village authorities selected the recipients of 
financial support. To this end, the local party secretary and elected village headman decided 
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based on the number of beneficiaries, the number of pigs (at least four) and the size of the 
pigsty.261 
At the same time, households were able to save expenditures for fuel and fertiliser. Ashden 
(2008) calculated possible savings as follows: 
A biogas plant reduces household expenditure on fuel and fertiliser. One 8 to 
10m3 biogas plant can supply a family of three to five people with enough 
gas for 90% of their daily fuel needs for 10 to 11 months of the year. This 
saves about US$75 per year (600 RMB) on fuel (coal or wood), US$40 per 
year (300 RMB) on fertiliser and US$20 per year (150 RMB) on electricity 
(through use of biogas lamps).262  
Thanks to the resulting income increase, households could break even in one to two years.263  
The afore-mentioned benefits contributed significantly to the stakeholders’ acceptance of the 
Sunflower Project, which was especially reflected in the prestige connected to the households’ 
participation. Households selected for biogas subsidies attached donor plaques on their front 
doors, and rooftop solar PV panels evolved into status symbols.264 
Government involvement 
Throughout the Sunflower Project’s activities, MMHB cooperated with different partners. 
Whereas many cooperation partners were NGOs, such as FOE and Give2Asia, other activities 
involved the support of government bodies, both on the provincial and the international level. 
For instance, during the organisation of events for public awareness rising, MMHB did not only 
receive support from Shaanxi Women’s Federation, but also from the provincial Development 
and Reform Commission (DRC) and the Department of Environmental Protection of the local 
government.265  
Table 5 provides an overview of different government and non-government cooperation 
partners of MMHB’s Sunflower Project. Donors include NGOs, such as Macao-based Badi 
Foundation for Village Capacity Building, Hong Kong-based FOE, Friends of Nature, 
Give2Asia, Global Biogas Capacity Building Project, Global Fund for Women, and Global 
Women Cooperation, as well as the World Bank. From the official side, the German Embassy 
and Chinese local government agencies such as the Shaanxi Province Hydrology Office also 
contributed financially. 
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Table 5 Overview of partners and donors of Shaanxi Sunflower Project. (Based on Radzi 2012, p. 135 and Shaanxi 
Mothers Environmental Protection Volunteers’ Association 2011) 
NGO partners Government partners 
• Badi Foundation for Village Capacity 
Building 
• FOE Hongkong 
• Friends of Nature 
• Give2Asia 
• Global Biogas Capacity Building Project 
• Global Fund for Women 
• Global Woman Cooperation 
• Shaanxi Women’s Federation 
• World Bank 
• Shaanxi DRC 
• Department of Environmental Protection 
• German Embassy 
• Local government agencies (e.g. Shaanxi 
Province Hydrology Office) 
Function of the niche 
According to MMHB’s estimates, each biogas household was able to save roughly 4.5 tonnes 
of wood and 6 tonnes of CO2 emissions per year, including both direct emissions from burning 
coal and wood as well indirect methane emissions from pig manure. Consequently, the 1,294 
biogas plants installed in 2006 reduced CO2 emissions by approximately 8,000 tonnes per 
year.266 Hence, from a macro-level perspective, the Sunflower Project contributed to the overall 
emission reduction goal as stipulated by the central government, although the exact extent of 
the project’s contribution remains difficult to quantify. 
On the niche level, MMHB was well-connected locally and received funds for their activities 
from various other civil organisations. For instance, an elementary school donated its revenues 
from a recycling initiative to finance MMHB’s tree planting activities.267 This shows that 
MMHB was embedded in a network that spans several stakeholder groups on the niche level, 
which corresponds to the characteristic interconnection of stakeholders both within and across 
actor networks on the niche level. Also analogous to the role of the niche in the MLP, the 
Shaanxi biogas scheme was mainly carried out by MMHB and the network it built with rural 
residents, other NGOs and government bodies, all of which were active locally. 
In addition, almost all of the four niche development phases described in chapter 2.1.3 can be 
found throughout the initiation and implementation of the Sunflower Project. Analogous to the 
first phase, in which a technological innovation serves at solving a specific local problem, 
MMHB decided to turn animal waste into a source of energy, combatting the pollution of rural 
environments and mitigating the resulting environmental and economic costs for the villagers. 
Expert workshops and trainings organised by MMHB resemble the expert groups who advance 
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and improve the innovation in the second phase. MMHB was also actively involved in 
expanding such expert groups, educating and empowering rural residents to maintain the biogas 
units. 
In the third phase, technological and economic improvements of the technological novelty are 
supposed to decrease average costs and increase the innovation’s competitiveness. However, 
the Shaanxi biogas scheme shows no sign of such economies of scale. Quite the contrary, 
subsidies from MMHB and the local government make it unnecessary to improve the 
competitiveness of these biogas units, indicating that the Shaanxi Sunflower Project may have 
been able to leapfrog this phase with the help of financial support. Nevertheless, the biogas 
technology underlying the Sunflower Project found imitators in rural areas of Jiangxi, 
Shandong and Sichuan provinces as well.268 Hence, the third phase is partly completed. 
Finally, the fourth phase, in which the new technology replaces the dominant one has been 
realised to a large part as well. Apart from certain dishes the villagers still prefer to prepare in 
their coal-fired ovens, biogas has replaced coal and wood as a source of electricity in all 
applications, i.e. cooking, heating and lighting. 269  With the exception of a few diverging 
practices, the Shaanxi Sunflower Project altogether underwent all relevant phases of niche 
development (see Table 6). The fact that it leapfrogged the third phase gives room to the 
hypothesis that active financial support or even government support, where applicable, makes 
it unnecessary for the innovation to become competitive on its own. This has further 
implications for the overall role of RECs in China in the context of experimentation under 
hierarchy and strategic niche management, which will be analysed more in-depth in chapter 
3.3. 
Table 6 Niche development phases in Shaanxi Sunflower Project. (Own table.) 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
X X (X) X 
The positive influences of MMHB’s Sunflower Project reached beyond the province of Shaanxi. 
Other villages expressed their respect for the readiness of the rural population in Shaanxi to 
adopt the new technology, MMHB’s entrepreneurial and fundraising capacities and the 
association’s persistence in light of bureaucratic challenges.270 The technology underlying the 
Shaanxi biogas scheme was adopted in the rural regions of Jiangxi, Shandong and Sichuan 
provinces as well.271 Although merely duplicating one niche innovation into another niche does 
not yet correspond to the niche-regime logic of the MLP, the possibility that influences from 
the niche reach up into the regime level in which policy-making takes place cannot be excluded. 
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As shown previously, the local government of Shaanxi is involved in the Sunflower Project to 
a crucial extent. Since it contributes to financing the installation of biogas units in private 
households and selects recipients of installation subsidies, it has an immediate stake in the 
Sunflower Project. At the same time, the local government works as an extended arm for the 
implementation of central climate policies. As the central government and related government 
bodies, such as the NEA have enshrined emission reduction and clean energy targets in several 
official documents, the local government of Shaanxi plays a bridging role for the realisation of 
these targets on the local level. 
Given the importance of RECs in the context of policy experimentation and in view of the 
success of the Shaanxi biogas scheme, it is not unlikely that the innovation from the Shaanxi 
niche permeates higher administration levels and feeds into central policy-making. Hereby, the 
biogas innovation has the chance to dominate the Chinese socio-technical energy regime. 
However, since not all Chinese cities will necessarily become entirely renewable, and biogas 
schemes are only suited for RECs with a similarly high reliance on agriculture, an absolute 
dominance of biogas schemes in the Chinese socio-technical energy system is rather improbable, 
but still possible in the sub-system of the rural energy transition. 
3.2.3.2. Tongli New Energy Town 
Tongli town, located in Wujiang district of Suzhou, Jiangsu province, is primarily known for 
its historic city centre and its numerous old canals. With an area of 33 hectares, the population 
of Tongli counts 58,000 people. Apart from its scenic reputation, however, Tongli is moving to 
the forefront of RE as well. Embedded into the broader Wujiang Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (WETDZ), Tongli is one of several towns in WETDZ to explore emerging 
industries, such as new energy, and is in search of international investors, as introduced by the 
Wujiang District Government on its website.272 Hence, the REC of Tongli is part of a broader 
strategy for regional development. At the second International Forum on Energy Transitions 
(IFET) in Tongli in October 2016, Jiangsu Electric Power Co. Ltd. (in the following abbreviated 
as ‘Jiangsu Electric’), the provincial subsidiary of State Grid, and the municipal government of 
Suzhou city announced they would turn Tongli into a model town for the international energy 
transition, and coined the ‘Green Tongli Model’ for the promotion of the energy transition.273 
The official Tongli New Energy Town Construction and Development Plan followed in 
November 2016, developed by the Tongji University School of Urban Planning and Design in 
Shanghai.274 Planned to be completed by 2022, TNET will be built in the historic city centre, 
where the major share of Tongli’s energy use is concentrated.275 On an area of roughly 3 km², 
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TNET is designed to integrate electricity, heating and cooling and transport into a holistic RE 
system.276  
However, there is little academic research on TNET. Apart from an extensive video report and 
two academic articles, the relevant body of literature mainly consists of official press releases 
by the local government, official government agencies and the German Energy Agency (dena), 
as well as diverse reports on news websites. 
Initiation 
As opposed to the Shaanxi Sunflower Project, scattered information on Tongli indicates that 
the town was selected top-down as an RE experimentation zone. Yet, the exact factors that led 
to the establishment of TNET remain vague. Long et al. (2018) argue that Tongli took part in a 
joint initiative by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MoHURD), 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the NDRC. In their Notification of the Launch of Cultivation 
Work for Unique Towns (关于开展特色小镇培育工作的通知), the three ministries announced it 
would foster 1000 ‘unique and vigour’ 277 towns for leisure, trade and commerce, modern 
manufacturing, educational technology, and traditional culture. Since Tongli possessed an 
already pronounced RE industry, this may have qualified the town for this government 
initiative.278 Notwithstanding, renewable energies receive no particular attention in the official 
notification, and hence, the authors’ argumentation lacks clear evidence. 
Nonetheless, Suzhou was among the three batches of ‘low-carbon provincial area and city pilots’ 
(低碳省区和城市试点) selected by the NDRC between 2010 and 2017.279 It is thus possible 
that Tongli was selected by the Suzhou government in line with the NDRC’s call for low-carbon 
pilot projects. Before being approved, the Tongli New Energy Town Construction and 
Development Plan had to undergo a technical review by the Water Conservancy and 
Hydropower Planning Unit of the NEA Department for New Energy, the National Renewable 
Energy Centre and other relevant units.280 This shows that from the beginning, TNET had close 
contact to central government bodies. 
The establishment of TNET is divided into two phases, i.e. in a construction phase from 2016-
2020, and a subsequent improvement phase. The result will be an REC with “low energy 
consumption, an innovative model, broad application, high efficiency and unique features”.281 
By 2020, TNET is supposed to be nearly 100 percent renewable.282 With an installed capacity 
of 121.6 kilowatts (kW), solar PV power is going to account for the major share in Tongli’s 
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future energy mix, followed by installed capacities of 10.02 kW for wind energy, 1.9 kW for 
water heat pumps and 0.44 t for biomass energy. On a surface of 2.4 km², TNET will realise 
the following five key projects: Firstly, it will establish a ‘triple supply system’ based on ultra-
high voltage transmission, megawatt photovoltaic power station and natural gas.283 Secondly, 
it will improve capacities for local energy self-sufficiency through a water-fuelled heat pump 
system in the ancient town district, small solar photovoltaic power stations, and micro-grids as 
to enable on-site consumption of locally generated energy. Thirdly, it aims to transform the 
electricity grid by optimizing the distribution network, establishing a smart ‘energy internet’, 
and installing energy storage facilities. Fourthly, TNET will promote energy saving by the 
construction of energy efficient buildings, the application of new technology, supporting green 
transportation, and reducing energy consumption. Fifthly, TNET’s generated energy is 
supposed to extend to a range of 167km², thus reaching into the wider WETDZ.284 In addition, 
it will contribute to the promotion of WETDZ with the help of new energy companies and 
institutions, technology incubators, and exchange platforms for innovation and training, as to 
upgrade and demonstrate the national energy transition on the international stage.285 At present, 
Tongli is already surrounded by parking lots equipped with charging stations for electric 
vehicles.286 
Stakeholder participation 
Active stakeholder participation from residents in the design and development plays an 
important role for TNET. At information events, on digital platforms and applications, in public 
lectures and in neighbourhood gatherings, residents may express their needs and 
recommendations.287 In addition, TNET does not only emphasise the mere application of RE, 
but also aims to integrate culture and tradition with environmental protection. To preserve the 
traditional stove as a symbol of Tongli’s indigenous culture and history while making it more 
sustainable, firewood is being replaced by ‘green coal’, i.e. biomass briquettes, which 
significantly reduce air pollution. Thereby, customs and habits of local stakeholders are 
respected. 288  Apart from residents in the ancient town, visitors shall benefit from the 
convenience and innovativeness of new energy services in TNET as well.289 
Although there is little information on the concrete design of stakeholder participation, 
interestingly, Suzhou city utilises internet forums to engage with stakeholders. On a website 
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called ‘Suzhou Convenience Service Centre’ (苏州市便民服务中心), the operator offers a 
Q&A feature for local netizens. On 15 November 2016, an online user, presumably a resident 
of Zhongliang Benyuan community in Wujiang district, asked if there were preferential 
government policies for the installation of solar PV panels on private rooftops. A staff member 
replied with a description of current PV subsidies, referring to the ‘Notice of the NDRC on 
Promoting the Sound Development of the Photovoltaic Industry by the National Development 
and Reform Commission’.290 The subject of the inquiry – ‘Zhongliang Benyuan community is 
willing to support the construction of TNET’ (中粮本源小区愿支持同里新能源小镇建设) – 
hints to a high acceptance among residents towards the REC project. Apart from this online 
service, which is commissioned by the Suzhou Municipal Government, TNET established a 
Centre for Integrated Energy Services, located in the North of the ancient town. Although the 
centre is mainly responsible for implementing innovative energy technologies, such as electric 
roads, charging stations, passive houses, and direct current power distribution systems, one may 
assume that it serves as a contact point for stakeholders and visitors as well.291  
Unlike the case of Shaanxi Sunflower Project, there is no sign that TNET is well-connected to 
other niche actors. Rather, its network focuses on other official institutions and agencies. Local 
stakeholders get the chance to meet at information events and other gatherings to voice their 
ideas, but there have been no reports on trainings and workshops which enable them to actively 
participate in the local energy transition. In addition, dena (2018a) has been the only source of 
information on stakeholder participation at the afore-mentioned kind of events, yet, no accounts 
on the Chinese side have verified such activities so far.292 Hence, the overall extent to which 
stakeholders may actively participate remains unclear, although the European cases have 
proved that niche actors can be a critical success factor for the development of niches. 
Government involvement 
As shown above, Chinese government bodies have been intensively involved with TNET from 
the beginning. Selected as a low-carbon pilot city by the Suzhou Municipal Government on 
order of the NDRC, Jiangsu Electric announced it would actively collaborate with the municipal 
government in the three-year construction plan of TNET. Thereby, Jiangsu Electric aims at 
integrating their ideas into the overall government plan, hoping for active government support 
in policies related to the energy transition. More precisely, Jiangsu Electric hopes for 
government support in the four fields of action in TNET, i.e. energy storage, grid infrastructure 
upgrading, smart grid demonstration as well as energy transition demonstration.293 After the 
selection of Tongli, the construction of TNET had to be approved by a committee composed of 
relevant departments and units from the NEA. The NEA has also pledged support for the 
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establishment of TNET. To what extent these official bodies assessed TNET in the context of 
China’s broader energy transition and related policies, however, remains unclear. After signing 
the Agreement for the Construction of a Strong Smart Grid and the Promotion of the 
Development of the Energy Transition with the Wujiang District Government, Suzhou Power 
Supply Company (abbreviated as ‘Suzhou Power’), a Jiangsu Electric subsidiary, is also 
involved in TNET. Responsible for the construction of a smart grid in Tongli, Suzhou Power 
plays an active role in exploring the afore-mentioned ‘Green Tongli Model’.294 
As Table 7 shows, the majority of partners involved in the establishment of TNET is composed 
of government bodies and agencies. The only NGO is the German energy agency ‘dena’, which 
assisted the Suzhou Municipal Government in assessing and selecting appropriate technologies 
and concepts from multiple cities worldwide to be integrated into the concept of TNET, together 
with the E.ON Energy Research Centre at RWTH Aachen.295 However, as an executing organ 
for the German energy transition, dena is closely connected to the German Federal 
Government. 296  As opposed to the Shaanxi Sunflower Project, the civil society is not 
significantly involved in the establishment of this REC. Instead, government institutions are 
leading the development of TNET, which has significant implications for the function of the 
niche.  
Table 7 Overview of partners of TNET. Based on (China Electricity Council 7/22/2016), (Deutsche Energie-Agentur 
2018a), (China Power News Network 11/23/2016) 
NGO partners Government partners 
• dena 
• E.On Research Centre (RWTH Aachen) 
• Jiangsu Electric 
• NEA 
• Suzhou Power 
• Suzhou Municipal Government 
• Wujiang District Government 
Function of the niche 
As the first pilot project for Suzhou, Tongli is designed to serve as a model for the future energy 
transition and development of the region, implying that other towns are supposed to follow.297 
In addition, the creation of the ‘Green Tongli Model’ indicates that TNET is designed to be 
replicated in other cities as well, while Tongli’s aspiration to evolve into a permanent 
conference site for IFET implies that this model shall be imitated not only in China, but also 
worldwide. This assumption is supported by a step-by-step instruction based on learnings from 
TNET, which aims at facilitating the initiation of RECs for other cities as well.298 Firstly, Tongli 
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compiled a GHG inventory which displays the sources and composition of local GHG 
emissions. Secondly, Tongli prioritised RE such as wind, solar PV and geothermal in the local 
energy mix, while retaining natural gas in order to safeguard energy security. Thirdly, TNET 
took measures to make fossil fuel-based energy sources cleaner and more efficient, such as 
replacing conventional coal with biomass briquettes for traditional stoves. Fourthly, TNET 
limited the expansion of energy intensive industries as demanded by the national energy supply 
reform. However, TNET largely serves as a demonstration of technological innovations related 
to energy. Analogous to Späth and Rohracher’s (2012) observations in Austrian Energy 
Regions, TNET may rather be seen as a feasibility project designed for technology transfer onto 
other niches than an incubator of radical innovation for broader transition.299 
Apart from these differences, the evolution of TNET also diverges from the niche development 
described in chapter 2.1.3. First, TNET was not primarily created to solve local problems. 
Instead, Tongli was presumably selected by the Suzhou Municipal Government because 
WETDZ already provided appropriate industrial infrastructure to build upon. Hence, the first 
phase of niche development was omitted. The second phase is partly applicable, since relevant 
government institutions and local subsidiaries of state-owned State Grid assumed the role of 
expert groups to further improve the innovation. Nevertheless, the composition of this expert 
group does not entirely correspond with the original idea. The most crucial difference is that 
the actors in this case are not members of the local community, but rather representatives of the 
socio-technical regime, since they are either affiliated with government institutions (policy) or 
incumbent utilities (industry). This may imply that the improvements of the innovation are not 
necessarily tailored to local needs and expert groups composed of niche actors may have 
adapted it differently. Active participation from regime members may in turn signify that the 
adaptations best fit official narratives and requirements of the innovation. The third phase, in 
which the cost effectiveness of the innovation is improved by competition is not applicable 
either. The ongoing infrastructure construction is likely to require significant investment capital, 
which indicates that TNET would not have survived under normal market conditions. As TNET 
is commissioned and funded by government institutions, there has been no need to improve the 
price ratio of the innovation. Yet, government subsidies for the installation of distributed energy 
systems, as suggested by the conversation between an online user and the Suzhou Convenience 
Service Centre, may increase the adoption rate for local households. This finding underpins the 
observation made in chapter 3.2.3.1, indicating that financial support may help to leapfrog this 
phase. The fourth phase, in which the dominant regime configuration is completely replaced, is 
almost completed in TNET. With the exception of natural gas, the targeted energy mix of Tongli 
will be completely renewable. Altogether, TNET did not undergo all development phases of 
niche innovations, as can be seen in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Niche development phases in TNET. (Own table) 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
 (X)  X 
The sum of these deviations from the classical MLP understanding strongly support the 
hypothesis that TNET has not evolved as a result of spontaneous niche dynamics but through 
SNM. As visible in Table 8, TNET shows similar gaps in the niche development as the cases 
of Helsinki and Murau, which have been identified as examples for SNM as well. In addition, 
the pervasive involvement of government representatives, along with the location of TNET in 
a broader experimentation zone clearly indicate that TNET was established as a pilot 
experiment. 
3.3. Results 
Despite wide variations between RECs worldwide, the MLP offers a comprehensive framework 
for the analysis of both general and specific drivers behind the energy transitions of the 
respective cities and regions. The framework helps to assess the role of niche innovation in light 
of broader trends on the landscape level, which are out of reach for purposeful interventions, as 
well as elements in the energy regime, which represent coordinated interactions between actors 
and institutions. The comparative analysis across the three levels landscape, regime and niche 
finally allows comprehending why and how European countries and China engage in the 
promotion of RECs. Results of the analysis will be presented below. 
Why do countries generally promote RECs? 
General motivations to foster 100 percent renewable niches can be found on the landscape level. 
Macro-level developments such as climate change, which is also a cause for resource scarcity, 
along with progressive urbanisation and digitalisation are increasing energy demand and 
pressuring nations to develop appropriate measures for climate change mitigation.300 The US’ 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement can be seen as another setback for international climate 
policy, although the impacts of the withdrawal are being debated. 
Elements on the regime level explain the relevance of RECs for the energy transition. 
Facilitated by favourable regime elements, e.g. the increasing decentralisation of energy 
generation and consumption, transforming cities and regions to 100 percent renewable 
constitutes a reasonable starting point for achieving an extensive energy transition.301 Other 
elements highlight further benefits of such local approaches. For instance, improvements on 
DES and decreasing costs of RE technologies make local generation and consumption of energy 
more favourable than centralised energy supply via large grids (industry). The expansion of RE 
in general is supported by increasing public awareness (culture), the Paris agreement including 
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SDGs and NDCs (policy), as well as efficiency improvements and the compatibility of RE with 
other technologies (technology). 
However, many regime elements are challenging the expansion of RE globally. For instance, 
stakeholders may oppose the installation of RE for different reasons (culture). The energy 
market is dominated by energy monopolies and other incumbent actors in many countries. In 
addition, levelized costs of energy have remained higher than for conventional energy 
(industry). Furthermore, consumers hesitate to invest in RE due to high initial investment and 
switching costs, paired with other financial insecurities (markets and user preferences). Hard 
institutions, i.e. unfavourable policy frameworks, as well as soft institutions, i.e. conflicts 
between key stakeholders negatively affect the adoption and acceptance of RE.302 Lack of data 
and skills shortage hamper research on RE technologies (science), while existing RE 
technologies often lack capacities. Long life-cycles of old devices and installations, as well as 
insufficient grid capacities lead to inefficiencies (technology). These impeding elements will 
need to be adjusted in many countries to accelerate the energy transition. 
Why does China promote RECs? 
Since the Chinese landscape is affected by international developments as well, the Chinese 
energy system has been struggling with the same landscape drivers as the international energy 
system, which makes it imperative to transition to cleaner energy sources. Environmental 
pollution, which affects public health and results in high economic costs, along with continued 
urbanisation, which will further increase domestic energy demand are key drivers in the Chinese 
context. 
In addition, China has been facing particular pressure for being the largest emitter of GHG 
worldwide. 303  The central government has recognised both the need to transition towards 
cleaner energy and the potential of distributed energy. Consequently, official documents, such 
as official plans and strategies by the NDRC and the NEA aim at promoting the expansion of 
DES, overarched by the 13th FYP which formulates general goals (policy). The expansion of 
DES in China will ultimately benefit from the shift in the national economic growth model. 
Shifting away from production-driven heavy industry to a consumption-driven economic model, 
the demand for large power loads from factories will be replaced by dispersed demand for 
smaller power loads (industry).304 In addition, the expansion of RE can build on China’s leading 
role in the global market for RE technologies, as well as from promising new business models 
based on distributed energy (market).305 
                                                          
302 Köhler et al. 2018, p. 16-17. 
303 Aklin and Urpelainen 2018, p. 202. 
304 International Energy Agency 2017a, p. 12. 
305 International Energy Agency 2017b, p. 471. 
62 
 
Nevertheless, similar to the international energy regime, China needs to improve certain regime 
elements. The dominance of state-owned energy utilities such as State Grid and relevant 
subsidiaries potentially hinders the establishment of decentralised energy infrastructure and 
conflicts may arise from the obligation for generators to sell energy to their grids (industry). In 
addition, the Chinese energy infrastructure suffers from inefficient grid capacities, although 
energy efficiency of RE technologies has increased (technology).306 
The example of Köhler et al.’s (2017) application of the MLP, on which the analysis was based, 
seems to suggest that the framework merely tried to grasp those elements that could be 
identified easily, while omitting those that did not apply. A broader literature review can 
circumvent this shortcoming and extend the analysis of the Chinese energy regime with a 
comprehensive report on relevant regime elements. However, due to the limited scope of this 
thesis, the applied regime analysis relied mainly on reports by the International Energy Agency 
(2017a; 2017b). Hence, to verify the extent to which all six elements apply to the Chinese 
energy regime, future research may refer to a more diversified body of literature. 
How do the countries promote RECs? 
The comparative analysis of seven European and two Chinese RECs finally delivered answers 
to how Europe and China promote local energy transitions by highlighting how different RECs 
emerged and developed. The multi-case report drew from different systematic case studies, all 
of which are coincidentally located within Europe. However, the RECs were not selected based 
on their location, but rather with regard to the availability of structured records and a 
representative diversity throughout their implementation. Concurrently, the cases differ in 
scope, ranging from sparsely populated villages like Feldheim to large cities like Graz and 
Freiburg. Accordingly, transitioning towards 100 percent RE is more facile in smaller villages 
than in larger cities, which may explain why Graz and Freiburg have not yet completely become 
entirely renewable. 
It should also be noted that the results are based exclusively on a collection and interpretation 
of these case studies, without having made own observations. Furthermore, since these case 
studies were compiled during 2010 and 2014, this sample does not represent RECs which 
emerged in recent years. Yet, the fact that the majority of selected cases have been completed 
allows for consideration of their results and lessons learnt. Finally, although the landscape and 
regime analyses do not correspond with the time frame of the respective cases, the analyses still 
provide a valid overview of the energy sector. Since developments on the landscape level are 
changing slowly, trends such as climate change and urbanisation have not lost their relevance 
but have rather become ever more important in recent years. Accordingly, regime elements are 
not expected to have changed significantly, since aspects such as the awareness for 
environmental degradation (culture) or the dominance of incumbent energy utilities (industry) 
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have presumably existed before. This is illustrated by the example of Freiburg, where the plan 
to construct a nuclear plant had led to significant protests among the citizens in 1970. 
In order to assess whether RECs materialised as a result of spontaneous niche development or 
SNM, four proxy criteria were developed. The criterion Initiation aimed at comprehending 
drivers which had immediately led to the establishment of the respective REC, investigating if 
the niche had developed an innovative solution for a specific local problem or if organisations 
had intentionally selected the REC. In some cases, factors leading to the initiation of the RECs 
traced back to a need for solutions to problems that occurred locally. In the case of Graz and 
Shaanxi, such problems were related to environmental pollution, with the former suffering from 
poor air quality and the latter from deforestation and polluted groundwater. Facing increasing 
fuel debts, Güssing saw itself pressured to transition to locally available energy sources instead 
of importing them. In Freiburg, the planned installation of a nuclear energy plant gave rise to 
local protests, pressing the municipality to react. Feldheim was forced to construct an 
independent energy grid as a result of unsuccessful bargaining with the regional incumbent 
facility.  
As opposed to the previous cases, strategic decisions have induced the establishment of the 
RECs in Helsinki, Jühnde, Murau and Tongli. Whereas Jühnde was designed as a research 
project by a research institute, the regional energy agency of Murau developed the vision of an 
Energy Region in cooperation with the help of a facilitator and an activist team. Helsinki and 
Tongli were both selected by respective government bodies for the purpose of experimentation, 
which can be seen as a first indicator for SNM. 
Although evidence for strategic selection of RECs already corresponds with the concept of 
SNM, the analysis was extended by additional criteria, considering that a clear distinction 
between bottom-up and top-down initiation would be inaccurate.307 Rather, this thesis attempts 
to understand bottom-up and top-down initiation as a continuum. Therefore, the second 
criterion stakeholder participation assessed the degree to which local actors were involved in 
the niche development, since they are supposed to play a vital role for the further improvement 
of the niche.308  
The assessment of stakeholder participation was characterised by multiple overlaps in the way 
the RECs engaged with niche actors. In all cases except for Helsinki and Tongli, stakeholders 
were given the opportunity to actively participate in the niche development. Workshops as a 
tool for knowledge transfer were particularly emphasised throughout Murau, Jühnde and 
Shaanxi, empowering residents to assume responsibilities in local energy generation as 
prosumers. In Shaanxi, rural households, particularly female family members were educated to 
operate their own biogas plants. Güssing spent much effort in institutionalising knowledge 
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transfer by founding a Solar School and an expert centre. In Jühnde, residents were invited to 
participate in a large variety of activities, ranging from planning workshops to social activities. 
The support of residents was especially vital in Feldheim, where the construction of the new 
grid substantially depended on the financial contribution of local households. The local 
population was in turn rewarded with a broad range of sponsored social activities. Such forms 
of stakeholder engagement substantially increased acceptance of the expansion of RE in all of 
the afore-mentioned RECs. 
The significance of sufficient room for stakeholder participation is particularly reflected by 
Helsinki, where the involvement of residents in the design of Eco-Viikki was not emphasised 
as much. Although some residents had the opportunity to realise own building concepts, 
workshops for knowledge dissemination were primarily targeted at experts. Improper 
maintenance of solar installations and mixed feedback from residents hence indicate that the 
crucial target group, i.e. local niche actors, was clearly missed. In Tongli, explicit accounts of 
the extent to which residents can actively shape the design of TNET are lacking, since existing 
news reports focus on the role of the relevant government bodies. The only indications of active 
stakeholder engagement in the design and development phases come from dena, without 
according evidence in Chinese documents. In addition, effects of TNET on the local population 
have to materialise yet, since the project is still under construction. However, TNET attempts 
to preserve traditional symbols such as ovens by providing clean coal, and a dialogue between 
a local netizen and a service platform shows that the developers of TNET are generally 
responsive to stakeholder feedback. 
The third criterion government influence in turn evaluated the extent to which government 
representatives participated in the niche development, again, to grasp potential indicators for 
SNM. The findings are then summarised and analysed in the fourth criterion, function of the 
niche. In this criterion, the four phases of niche development laid out by Geels (2004) were 
used as a heuristic to determine if the RECs had emerged through niche development or SNM. 
The role of higher official bodies such as ministries and government agencies in the European 
cases was mostly limited to funding, e.g. in Güssing and Jühnde. Analogously, the Shaanxi 
Sunflower Project received financial support from provincial authorities and agencies. In 
addition, when necessary, village authorities assumed the responsibility to select recipients. In 
the cases of Freiburg and Jühnde, the municipalities were involved in the design and supervision 
of the respective implementation processes. The municipality of Freiburg particularly supported 
the expansion of energy-saving technologies, while imposing effective insulation and energy 
efficiency standards at the same time. 
Three cases stood out with a higher degree of government influence. In the case of Feldheim, 
the German Federal Government had to step in to adapt the regulatory framework, as the village 
lacked appropriate ownership laws for its independent grid. This intervention was not intended 
and may thus be regarded as an exception, whereas the RECs in Helsinki and Tongli showed 
65 
 
intentionally strong government involvement from the beginning. Eco-Viikki was established 
on order of the Finnish Ministry of Environment and an association of Finnish architects, while 
the design and implementation of this pilot experiment were executed by the municipality of 
Helsinki. In addition, it was largely sponsored by both the relevant ministry and Tekes, the 
national funding agency. The government’s tight control of the project development was also 
reflected by the fact that a third of the plot area belonged to the state. Similar to Eco-Viikki, 
TNET was selected by the local government on order of government ministries and the NDRC, 
which asked for the establishment of ‘unique towns’, while the town takes part in a broader 
experimentation zone and a pilot project for low-carbon provinces and cities at the same time. 
Supported by the NEA and in collaboration with the municipality, two subsidiaries of State 
Grid play leading roles for the construction of TNET. The predominant role of government 
bodies in both Eco-Viikki and TNET are further indications for SNM, implications of which 
will be highlighted in the fourth criteria, function of the niche. 
As a summary of the three previous criteria, the criterion function of the niche also serves as a 
proxy to determine if the respective RECs were predominantly characterised by innate niche 
dynamics in the sense of the MLP or if they were a result of SNM. Therefore, this criterion 
referred to the four phases of niche development introduced in chapter 2.1.3, which allowed 
evaluation of the evidence for MLP and SNM in light of successful project completion, based 
on the premise that success is measured by the complete replacement of the dominant but non-
renewable energy systems through RE. Results from this evaluation are summarized in Table 
9. 
Table 9 Niche development phases in the European and Chinese RECs. (Own table) 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Graz X X   
Güssing X X (X) X 
Feldheim X X n.a. X 
Freiburg X X   
Helsinki  (X)  X 
Jühnde  X (X) X 
Murau  X (X) X 
Shaanxi X X (X) X 
Tongli  (X)  X 
The evaluation concluded with the fact that the majority of selected RECs did not undergo all 
phases of niche development. Whereas Graz, Güssing, Feldheim, Freiburg and Shaanxi 
established RECs to respond to local environmental or economic problems, in Helsinki, Jühnde, 
Murau and Tongli such pilot projects emerged as a result of strategic decisions, either from 
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government bodies or organisations such as energy agencies. Hence, these cases omitted the 
first development phase. 
The second phase was completed by almost all RECs. They saw the emergence of niche 
community in the second phase of niche development, which assumed the role of expert groups 
and were responsible for improving the innovation, i.e. the introduction and expansion of RE 
in their communities. As immediate users of the innovation, niche actors can be particularly 
helpful for further enhancements of the niche. Although Helsinki evidentially asked experts 
throughout the design and implementation of Eco-Viikki, the developers failed to integrate the 
users, i.e. residents of Eco-Viikki. Not only would they have provided valuable feedback for 
the design of the experimental area, but they would have been crucial for the operation of the 
installed solar technology. Whereas most RECs offered workshops to local stakeholders, the 
one-sided knowledge transfer in Eco-Viikki led to inappropriate maintenance of solar 
installations. As a result, Eco-Viikki was not able to achieve its reduction targets. 
Whereas Shaanxi Sunflower Project consulted experts to educate rural households how to 
operate their biogas plants, government institutions related to energy and local subsidiaries of 
State Grid assumed the role of such expert groups. Without any systematic form of user 
engagement, however, TNET risks being tailored to official requirements rather than local 
needs. By providing channels for stakeholder feedback, TNET may be able to avoid mistakes 
made in Eco-Viikki. The online Q&A feature offered by the Suzhou Convenience Service 
Centre may serve as a useful basis. 
The third phase, in which the innovation improves its competitiveness with regard to price-
performance ratio and compatibility with existing technologies, was not fully applicable to the 
selected sample. This was because government funding for RE makes it unnecessary to enhance 
the competitiveness inherent to RE in comparison to conventional energy. With its independent 
energy grid, Feldheim was a particular case which did not have to consider price-performance 
ratio and technical compatibility of its renewable energy sources, given that the village had no 
choice but to establish parallel structures. Consequently, this phase fails to capture Feldheim. 
Yet, hints for economic improvements through RE could be observed in Jühnde, where the 
costs of RE generation were adapted to price levels of conventional energy, as well as in 
Güssing, where the introduction of RE itself improved the cost effectiveness for the entire 
village by cutting its energy expenditures by 50 percent within two years. Nonetheless, some 
RECs gave impetus for imitations, which is another characteristic for the third phase and which 
was observed in Murau, Jühnde and Shaanxi. Consequently, these RECs partly completed the 
third phase. Yet, the fact that none of the RECs were forced to enhance the competitiveness of 
their installed RE systems lead to the assumption that financial support from government bodies 
helps to leapfrog the third phase. 
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The fourth phase is completed if the innovation was able to replace the dominant technology 
completely, i.e. if the introduction of RE was able to phase out the dominance of fossil fuelled 
energy entirely. Apart from Graz, Freiburg and Tongli, which are yet to achieve this goal, all 
selected RECs have become almost 100 percent renewable. Notwithstanding, there were 
obvious differences between the ways in which the RECs completed this phase, mainly owing 
to the disparity of niche development in the context of the MLP vs. SNM. 
Based on the niche analysis, the cases of Güssing and Shaanxi can be attributed most to the 
MLP logic of niche development, whereas Helsinki and Tongli show the strongest evidence for 
SNM. However, while Güssing and Shaanxi underwent all four phases of niche development 
according to the MLP logic, Helsinki and Tongli were able to omit half of them. Yet, all four 
RECs completed the fourth phase, replacing fossil fuels in their respective energy mix by almost 
100 percent RE. Feldheim, Jühnde and Murau were able to leapfrog parts of the development 
phases with similar success, with Jühnde and Murau showing partial characteristics of SNM. 
In response to the criticism of a clear distinction between bottom-up and top-down, this thesis 
understands the relation between MLP and SNM as a continuum, onto which the selected RECs 
can be placed (see Figure 10). Decisive for the RECs’ positions, however, is not the number of 
fulfilled or omitted niche development phases. Rather, the four phases complement findings 
from the four criteria analysed before, which play a predominant role in determining if the 
RECs developed following the MLP logic or SNM, which is reflected in their position on the 
continuum below. 
 
Figure 10 Selected RECs on the continuum of MLP and SNM. (Own illustration) 
The analysis of the two Chinese RECs has shown that in the context of sustainability transitions, 
Chinese RECs do not differ significantly from their European counterparts as initially assumed. 
Chinese initiatives for 100 percent RE on the niche level have proved to be equally diverse as 
international RECs with regard to their initiation, design and function. The case of Shaanxi 
Sunflower Project has been particularly surprising, as it falsified the underlying assumption that 
RECs in China were exclusively selected in a top-down process. Equally valuable was the 
justified objection that a simple dichotomy of bottom-up and top-down fails to capture the 
interactivity of Chinese policy-making processes, in which local and central government bodies 
in fact depend upon each other. From the government perspective, however, the development 
of RECs must necessarily follow the SNM logic, since grassroots initiatives emerge 
unpredictably. Implications of this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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The application of SNM to initiate local pilot projects in China is further facilitated by the well-
established practice of experimentation under hierarchy, serving at pretesting policy options 
before they are scaled up and implemented nationwide. Embedded in a broader experimentation 
zone and accompanied by supportive government documents, TNET has been identified as a 
case of SNM. As such, it benefits from political and financial support from government bodies 
on both the national and local level, which have proved to accelerate the ‘traditional’ niche 
development after the MLP. Nevertheless, TNET has the potential to learn from experiences in 
Shaanxi as well the European RECs, which will be discussed below. 
4. Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
By applying the concepts of MLP and SNM onto the international and Chinese socio-technical 
energy systems, underpinned with evidence from seven European and two Chinese case studies, 
this thesis has contributed to a deeper understanding of sustainability transitions, with a focus 
on the role of RECs as niche experiments. Building upon Heilmann’s (2008) insight that a 
dichotomy of bottom-up and top-down initiation does not sufficiently capture the interactive 
dynamics between the regime and niche level, this thesis proposes to understand the relationship 
between MLP and SNM on a continuum. Developing proxy criteria on initiation, stakeholder 
participation, government influence and function of the niche helped to assess if the 
development of RECs was rather driven by the logic of the MLP or SNM. As a result, this thesis 
found that a stronger tendency towards MLP hints to the dominance of ‘natural’ niche dynamics, 
whereas a stronger tendency towards SNM indicates that strategic calculations were in play. 
Placing the RECs onto the developed continuum finally proved to be more suitable to 
comprehend the different relations between bottom-up and top-down, hence verifying 
Heilmann’s (2008) hypothesis. 
In addition, comparing the RECs with Geels et al.’s (2004) four phases of niche development 
allowed for evaluating the differences between MLP and SNM-driven cases in view of their 
results. Yet, the observations indicate that RECs with signs of SNM omitted at least one niche 
development phase.309 Consequently, SNM seems to distort the MLP-based understanding of 
dynamic niche development, although the target, i.e. becoming almost 100 percent renewable, 
was met nevertheless. This leads to the assumption that employing elements of SNM, such as 
financial support from governments and other regime institutions, can help leapfrog phases 
which would usually involve significant efforts for grassroots initiatives, e.g. for raising funds. 
Therefore, active government support can safeguard the survival of innovations which would 
struggle on their own. To determine if this support actually accelerates the development of the 
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owes to the fact that their path towards 100 percent renewable is yet to be completed. 
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niches, however, would require further research which takes temporal aspects into account. 
Implications of this finding will be further discussed in the practical implications section below. 
The analysis of the function of the niche in chapter 3.1.3 has shown that there can be controversy 
regarding whether or not RECs should be classified as a niche experiment. In this thesis, it was 
questioned if the RECs of Graz, Freiburg, Jühnde and Murau can be seen as veritable niches, 
arguing that they were not specifically designed to instigate a broader energy transition but 
rather to be copied in other regions as well. Nevertheless, this thesis reasons that such RECs, 
which serve as role models for other regions, cities and communities, can fulfil a valuable 
multiplier effect, which enables them to gradually build up momentum until they are recognised 
and taken up on the regime level. Hence, they constitute niches in the sense of this thesis. 
Practical implications 
Considering that almost all RECs were or will be able to replace fossil fuelled energy with RE 
in the medium or long-term, this thesis does not assert that one model was better than the other 
with regard to the effects of MLP or SNM-based niches, as each concept has its advantages and 
disadvantages.310 On the one hand, niches emerging from the MLP logic can have significant 
impact on the energy regime and play a supportive role for the broader energy transition, as 
demonstrated by the success of Güssing and Shaanxi. As the comparative analysis has shown, 
stakeholder participation is vital for the success of niches and as a result of grassroots initiative, 
strong stakeholder participation is inherent to RECs that are based on the MLP logic. On the 
other hand, such niches emerge unpredictably, supporting the argument that niche development 
cannot be steered purposefully. The advantage of SNM is that the successful replacement of the 
existing technology, i.e. fossil fuel-based energy generation, is guaranteed and may even be 
achieved in a faster pace. Yet, SNM risks to ignore the role of local niche actors, which may be 
reflected on overall stakeholder satisfaction and potentially impede the entire niche 
development. However, given that MLP-based niches cannot be induced actively, decision-
makers may have no other method to resort to than SNM. 
Accordingly, since niches evolve spontaneously in response to local problems following the 
logic of the MLP (see Shaanxi Sunflower Project), they are not calculable from the government 
perspective. Given that the Chinese central government is interested in promoting a nationwide 
energy transition to respond to landscape developments which lead to an increased domestic 
energy demand, it must hence employ means of SNM in order to foster energy transitions in 
the country’s regions, cities and communities. The decentralised nature of distributed energy 
generation and the sustainability of RE make RECs a viable and promising option for this. 
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become energy self-sufficient in the future but are challenged by their sizes, since they are larger as the other 
cases. 
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Consequently, what decision-makers can learn from these indispensable but uncontrollable 
niches is to put stronger emphasis on stakeholder participation, i.e. to create channels to obtain 
user feedback and let local niche actors participate actively in the design and implementation 
of RECs. This information supports the argument that stakeholder participation can and should 
be planned for in SNM (see chapter 2.1.3). Hence, the case studies analysis proved that although 
active government support can secure the survival of a niche, a high degree of government 
influence may fail to adapt the niche innovation to user needs, whereas a high degree of 
stakeholder participation potentially increases the acceptance of niche actors towards the 
project. Consequently, a position in the middle of the continuum between MLP and SNM seems 
most desirable. As shown in Figure 10 (p. 67), Jühnde and Murau as well as Graz and Freiburg 
are closest to the position in the middle. While Jühnde and Murau can be seen as viable role 
models, given that they incorporate both strategic initiation and appropriate means of 
stakeholder participation, final results for Graz and Freiburg are still pending. Decision-makers 
who intend to employ SNM for the formation of a new niche are thus advised to create sufficient 
room for stakeholder participation already in the project design. In doing so, failures as in 
Helsinki can be avoided. 
These insights are particularly valuable for Chinese RECs. Although it is difficult to evaluate 
TNET at this point in time, given that it is not yet completed and reports on its project design 
are rather one-sided, local governments and official project developers could plan for 
appropriate forms of stakeholder participation in pilot experiments ordered by central 
government authorities. Shaanxi Sunflower Project can serve as a valuable example, since the 
grassroots initiative was able to exploit the potential of comprehensive stakeholder participation 
while receiving support from local government bodies and agencies as well. As a result, the 
project was rewarded with a high degree of acceptance among local niche actors. Analogously, 
sound and comprehensive stakeholder management in Tongli could raise acceptance and 
satisfaction from local stakeholders towards TNET. This is not only crucial because niches can 
benefit from users and their experiences, but also because stakeholder resistance has been 
identified as a significant obstacle for niche development in the regime analysis. 
In addition, Chinese decision-makers could take measures to reduce the influence of incumbent 
regime actors. As the regime analysis has shown, the Chinese energy market is largely 
dominated by State Grid and its provincial subsidiaries, and the establishment of TNET has 
proved that these monopolies play a crucial role in the development of RECs as well. However, 
the third strategy of SNM advises limiting the influence of incumbent players in the regime. In 
doing so, decision-makers could prevent vested interests of large grid operators from impeding 
the expansion of distributed energy. 
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Limitations and implications for further research 
Owing to different reasons, the findings of this thesis are to be treated with care. Firstly, 
although the multi-case report is based on a diverse set of sources such as academic articles, as 
well as online reports and news, information on the selected cases is largely drawn from case 
study reports. As the comparative analysis relies on sources dating back to 2010–2014, apart 
from TNET, this thesis may have overlooked RECs which may have evolved in recent years. 
In addition, since all cases except for TNET have been analysed in retrospect, the findings 
cannot make any statements about more current results, nor can they compare the results with 
more recent RECs. These constraints can be explained with the limited scope of this thesis. 
For the same reason, the analysis of the landscape and regime levels may not accurately describe 
relevant influences on the selected RECs, since drivers and elements of the energy systems may 
have been different at the time when the case studies had been carried out. Nevertheless, since 
developments on the landscape level are changing slowly, trends such as climate change and 
urbanisation have not lost their relevance but have rather become ever more important. 
Similarly, decentralisation and distributed energy generation continue to be the main regime 
drivers for the energy transition. Hence, drivers and elements on the landscape and regime level 
have largely stayed the same. Nevertheless, future research may employ a retrospective when 
analysing socio-technical systems. 
The comparison of the different cases was further impeded by the varying scope of the RECs, 
which made it difficult to classify them appropriately with the niche-regime dichotomy. While 
some RECs were limited to villages, others covered entire cities or regions. A particular case 
was the Shaanxi Sunflower Project, which acted on the village-level but at the same time 
spanned several villages within Shaanxi province. 
Throughout the niche analysis, the criterion government influence has proved to require further 
adaptation. Although it provided valuable information about the extent to which government 
support can help RECs leapfrog certain phases of niche development, a criterion focusing on 
governance would have been able to better grasp the different actors behind the selection and 
initiation of RECs. 
Having proved that SNM plays a crucial role in many RECs internationally, future research 
may investigate methods to optimise the design of such niches. For this purpose, researchers 
may also consider the clear parallels between SNM and experimentation under hierarchy and 
attempt to exploit potential synergies of an approach which takes both concepts into account. 
Seeing pilot experiments in the context of SNM is particularly valuable for analysing the 
governance of related pilot projects in the China, yet theories related to the MLP and SNM have 
not yet been reflected in relevant Chinese literature. In addition, based on the hypothesis that 
RECs should aim to reach the middle of the continuum, further research may explore practical 
measures to realise such an MLP-SNM equilibrium. 
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5. Conclusion 
Worldwide, there is an increasing number of RECs, i.e. regions, cities and communities, which 
are either on their way to an almost entirely renewable energy mix or have already achieved it. 
Chinese government bodies have pledged to support the expansion of RECs as well. Hence, 
this thesis aimed to comprehend motivations for nations to engage in the promotion of RECs 
and highlight possibilities to do so, while focusing specifically on China’s ambitions, with the 
assumption that Chinese RECs are initiated top-down as pilot experiments. For this purpose, 
this thesis adopted two frameworks within the field of sustainability transitions. The MLP 
describes the dynamic evolution of niches and how they permeate the energy regime, while 
SNM explores how niches can be established and managed strategically. These frameworks 
were applied to a heterogeneous set of European and Chinese RECs and adapted to allow for 
their systematic comparison. 
Similar to other countries, arguments for China’s motivation to promote RECs were found in 
megatrends on the landscape level, such as urbanisation, digitalisation, resource scarcity, 
climate change and environmental pollution, all of which result in an increasing energy demand. 
This pressure was reinforced by unfavourable regime elements, such as the country’s 
substantial dependence on foreign fuel imports. 
To solve these challenges, transitioning to a cleaner domestic energy system is imperative. 
While the international cases employed varying methods related to SNM, next to niches which 
emerged on grassroots initiative, the Chinese government employs niche experimentation and 
it strategically selects locations for pilot projects. These serve to pre-test policy options before 
choosing those that are suited for a nationwide dissemination. As the case study on TNET has 
shown, RECs fulfil an experimental role in the broader Chinese energy transition, which 
corresponds to the concept of SNM at the same time. Simultaneously, grassroots initiatives 
from China’s civil society can emerge on the niche level and gradually build up momentum as 
supported by the MLP. This form of dynamic niche development was observed in the case of 
Shaanxi Sunflower Project, which had started on the village level, until it gradually expanded 
over Shaanxi province. Hence, evidence is supported by both the MLP and SNM, rejecting the 
assumption that Chinese RECs follow the SNM approach exclusively. 
In addition, analysing the respective RECs with regard to initiation, stakeholder participation, 
government influence and function of the niche revealed valuable learnings, which are relevant 
for Chinese RECs as well. Firstly, reasons for the initiation of RECs could either be the urge 
for RE to solve local environmental or economic problems or strategic selection with the aim 
to realise political decisions on higher administrative levels or to explore the technical 
feasibility of certain technologies. Secondly, the analysis of stakeholder participation showed 
that generally, RECs with stronger emphasis on user feedback and stakeholder participation 
were rewarded with higher acceptance, while the case of Helsinki indicated that insufficient 
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room for stakeholder participation can negatively affect the overall success of the project. 
Consequently, appropriate channels for stakeholder participation can be seen as crucial success 
factor for RECs. Thirdly, with regard to government influence, financial support has proved 
viable to secure the survival of the RECs. However, government influence should not be over-
emphasised to sustain a sound balance between stakeholder participation and government 
influence. The last criterion function of the niche determined the degree to which the logic of 
the MLP or SNM dominated the respective RECs. It concluded with the finding that a stronger 
MLP orientation corresponded with ‘natural’ niche dynamics, while a stronger SNM orientation 
hinted to strategic calculations behind the niche development. 
Both concepts have shown to be suited for the transition to 100 percent RE, but an over-
emphasis on SNM risks to neglect stakeholder needs and may cause resistance. Although an 
MLP-driven niche development bears the potential for higher stakeholder acceptance, the 
emergence of such niches is not controllable, which is why policy-makers have to resort to 
SNM. Putting stronger emphasis on stakeholder participation throughout SNM may mitigate 
this risk, as the cases of Jühnde and Murau have demonstrated.  
Accordingly, recommendations for Chinese and international decision-makers alike include 
efforts to ensure a balanced relationship between stakeholder participation and government 
influence. This also includes limiting the dominance of incumbent actors in the energy regime, 
such as large state-owned utilities. Acknowledging that grassroots RECs such as Shaanxi 
Sunflower Project emerge spontaneously and are thus not controllable, project designs based 
on SNM could incorporate stronger emphasis on stakeholder participation. Online channels for 
user feedback as offered in the case of Tongli serve as a useful basis. 
This thesis did not only contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of RECs in the context 
of the energy transition, but also added to conceptualising the relationship between the concepts 
of MLP and SNM. Based on in-depth analysis, this relationship is finally understood as a 
continuum ranging from MLP to SNM, allowing for are more differentiated understanding of 
bottom-up and top-down. The application of this continuum to the selected cases resulted in the 
conclusion, that an REC design which balances stakeholder participation and government 
influences is most desirable. In addition, this thesis identified clear parallels between the 
concept of SNM and experimentation under hierarchy. Future research could build upon the 
findings of this thesis by investigating possibilities to realise such a balanced REC design, as 
well as by including case studies from other parts of the world and applying a retrospective 
when analysing cases that have already been completed.  
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